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INTRODUCTION

A popular myth in American constitutional law is that the
"strict scrutiny" standard of review applied to enforce rights such as
free speech and equal protection is 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."'
1. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
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This phrase, coined by the late legal scholar Gerald Gunther in 1972,
has been called "one of the most famous epithets in American
constitutional law"' 2 and has effectively defined the strict scrutiny
standard in the minds of lawyers for two generations. Born of
Gunther's observation, supported by the iconic decisions of the Warren
Court, and reinforced in constitutional law teaching and scholarship,
the myth teaches that strict scrutiny is an "inflexible"3 rule that
4
invalidates every (or nearly every) law to which it applies.
In recent years, however, this traditional understanding of
strict scrutiny's inevitable deadliness has been challenged, most
notably by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. In Adarand Constructorsv.
Pena, O'Connor's majority opinion expressed the "wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 5 The
fact that strict scrutiny applies "says nothing about the ultimate
validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the
court applying" that standard. 6 In Grutter v. Bollinger, O'Connor's
opinion for the Court turned wish into action and upheld an
affirmative action policy under strict scrutiny. 7 Rather than create
insurmountable hurdles that indiscriminately invalidate laws,
O'Connor argued, the "fundamental purpose" of strict scrutiny is to
"take relevant differences into account."
In short, when applying
strict scrutiny, "[c]ontext matters."9
This Article contributes to this debate by offering a systematic
empirical study of strict scrutiny in the federal courts. Reporting the
results of a census of every strict scrutiny decision published by the
district, circuit, and Supreme courts between 1990 and 2003, this
study shows that strict scrutiny is far from the inevitably deadly test
imagined by the Gunther myth and more closely resembles the
context-sensitive tool described by O'Connor. Courts routinely uphold
laws when applying strict scrutiny, and they do so in every major area

2.
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose:A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
3.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to
anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration.").
4.
See Richard Fallon, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 79 (1997) ('strict in theory' will routinely prove 'fatal in
fact"').
5.
515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
6.
Id. at 230.
7.
539 U.S. 306, 326-28 (2003).
8.
Id. at 327 (quotations omitted).
9.
Id.
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of law in which they use the test.
Overall, 30 percent of all
applications of strict scrutiny-nearly one in three-result in the
challenged law being upheld. Rather than "fatal in fact," strict
scrutiny is survivable in fact.
This Article begins, in Part II, by defining the strict scrutiny
standard and tracing its theoretical underpinnings.
Both the
standard's formal terms and its underlying justifications leave ample
room for laws to be upheld-hence, Gunther's premise of "strict in
theory." Yet, in the Warren Court, the standard appeared to be "fatal
in fact" as rigorous review was employed to invalidate laws at
seemingly every turn. Coming on the heels of the Warren Court,
Gunther's quotable phrase crystallized the notion that strict scrutiny
was always (or nearly always) deadly. This view of strict scrutiny is
common, although as Justice O'Connor's statements suggest, it has
recently been subject to challenge. In addition to Justice O'Connor, a
number of academics have argued that the traditionally rigid tiers of
scrutiny so popular in American constitutionalism are softening.
Part III lays out the methodology of the empirical study and
reports the general results. A key assumption underlying the decision
to study all federal court decisions applying strict scrutiny is that
constitutional law cannot be fully understood by looking only at the
Supreme Court and its decisions.
American constitutional law
scholarship focuses almost exclusively on the Supreme Court, with
little attention to the lower federal courts. While the Supreme Court
sets the ground rules for judicial review, the lower courts are where
those rules are most often applied to specific facts and particular laws.
Thus, between 1990 and 2003, the Supreme Court only applied strict
scrutiny 12 times, upholding only a single law prior to 2002. During
that same period, the lower federal courts applied strict scrutiny in a
conclusive, final ruling 447 times. If one wants to comprehend how
strict scrutiny works, the lower federal court decisions must be
incorporated into the analysis.
Part IV addresses why some laws survive strict scrutiny while
others fail. If, as Justice O'Connor so powerfully argues, context
matters so much to strict scrutiny analysis, what exactly are the
contexts or differences that courts deem relevant? Examining the
strict scrutiny cases at the macro level, this Part isolates a number of
variables that appear to make a law more or less likely to survive
strict scrutiny review generally. One difference found to be relevant is
doctrinal: strict scrutiny does not operate with uniform "strictness"
across constitutional law. While it is more or less equally rigorous in
most areas of law-with a mean survival rate of 24 percent-in
religious liberty cases the standard is remarkably lenient. Here, strict
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scrutiny results in nearly 60 percent of challenged laws being upheld.
Another relevant difference is the governmental institution behind the
law. Courts tend to uphold federal judicial orders, federal legislation,
and prison policies alleged to infringe on core constitutional rights,
whereas state laws, local laws, and policies adopted by educational
institutions are more likely to be invalidated. Federalism is an
especially influential type of "relevant difference," as courts uphold
nearly half of federal laws subjected to strict scrutiny while rejecting
most state (and nearly all local) laws. This Part concludes by
estimating the parameters of several regression models of strict
scrutiny survival.
Part V takes a closer look at how contextual strict scrutiny
works within each of the five areas of law in which that standard is
found: suspect class discrimination, free speech, fundamental rights,
freedom of association, and religious liberty. The objectives of this
Part, which offers a micro-level analysis to accompany the earlier
macro-level analysis, are threefold. First, the strict scrutiny cases are
mapped out to identify what types of laws tend to survive and fail
within particular doctrines. In religious liberty cases, for instance,
generally applicable laws that substantially burden religious practices
are routinely upheld but laws intentionally discriminating against
religions are invariably overturned. In free speech cases, courts often
uphold restrictions on the right of access to judicial proceedings but
almost always overturn restrictions on access to public forums.
Second, this Part explores how the variables found to be significant
predictors of strict scrutiny survival by the estimated regression
models work within discrete doctrines. The results can be surprising.
For example, federalism is strongly correlated with strict scrutiny
survival in free speech cases, yet there is virtually no current debate
in constitutional law about whether federalism should be relevant to
judicial review under the Free Speech Clause. Third, this Part
explores unusual patterns that emerge in individual doctrines but
that are washed out in the aggregated, macro-level data. The political
ideology of the deciding judge, for example, does not appear to impact
strict scrutiny decisions generally.
Nevertheless, in race cases
political ideology is closely linked with judges' votes to uphold or
invalidate laws under strict scrutiny.
Contrary to the Gunther myth, laws can (and do) survive strict
scrutiny with considerable frequency. While it remains true that the
majority of laws subjected to strict scrutiny fall and that the
government typically faces an onerous task defending laws under this
standard, strict scrutiny is not nearly as deadly as generations of
lawyers have been taught. As Justice O'Connor has repeatedly tried
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to remind us, strict scrutiny responds to differences in context and is
capable of being overcome. Strict scrutiny is fatal only in Gunther's
theory and really just strict in fact.
II. "'STRICT' IN THEORY AND FATAL IN FACT"
A. What is Strict Scrutiny?
As a mode of judicial review in constitutional law cases, 10 the
strict scrutiny standard was first suggested by implication in the
famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products." Decided
in 1938, Carolene Products upheld a federal law banning the
interstate shipment of "filled" milk. 12 More importantly, Carolene
Products was one of the three cases 13 that overturned Lochner v. New
York 14 and put an end to the controversial judicial practice of
stringently limiting the ability of states and Congress to enact
progressive economic legislation. In the "most celebrated footnote in
constitutional law," 15 Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote:
10. As a judicial standard, "strict scrutiny" did not originate with twentieth-century
constitutional controversies. In the 1800s, courts employed that terminology in equity cases of
debtors who attempted to protect property from creditors by transferring it in suspicious
circumstances, such as a sale to another family member. When, for example, a man conveyed a
parcel of land to his wife ten days prior to the entrance of a judgment against him in favor of a
creditor, the Georgia Supreme Court wrote in 1876 that "[clontracts between [relatives] which
retain in the family property that would otherwise go to satisfy honest creditors are to be
subjected to strict scrutiny-a vigilant judicial police." Booher v. Worrill, 57 Ga. 235, 238 (1876)
(emphasis added). According to the court, strict scrutiny meant that only "slight evidence" of
fraud brought to the court's attention will "change the onus," shifting the burden of proof to "the
conjugal pair" to show "the genuineness and good faith of the transaction." Id. (emphasis added).
As the Nebraska Supreme Court explained in 1894, "conveyances by and transactions between a
failing debtor and his relatives are always suspicious and to be regarded with strict scrutiny, and
such transactions are badges of fraud, unless clearly explained." Altschuler v. Coburn, 38 Neb.
881, 889 (1894); see also Greer v. Altoona Warehouse Co, 20 So. 2d 513, 514-15 (Ala. 1945)
("After the complainant proved the existence of its debt, antedating the conveyance of Greer to
his wife, the defendants had the burden of proving the bona fides of the consideration and that it
was not greatly disproportionate to the value of the property conveyed, and the evidence offered
is subject to strict scrutiny because of the family relations."); Paddock v. Pulsifer, 23 P. 1049,
1051 (Kan. 1890) ("[W]here a parent, through extreme age and infirmity, has become childish,
and depends upon her son for advice in all her affairs, contracts made by her in his favor are
subject to the same strict scrutiny given to contracts of children in favor of their parents."); Gish
v. Unruhan, 165 P.2d 417, 418 (Kan. 1946) ("Another rule, here pertinent, is that on an issue of
this sort conveyances between members of a family are properly subjected to strict scrutiny.").
11. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
12. Id. at 145.
13. The other cases were W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. Lewis F. Powell Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982).
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There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held
to be embraced within the Fourteenth.... Nor need we enquire ... whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
16
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry.

In the wake of Carolene Products,17 economic legislation would
thereafter be judged by a standard of "rational basis": so long as the
law is a "rational" way of furthering any "legitimate" governmental
This standard is famously lenient, and,
purpose, it is valid.1 8
according to widespread belief, nearly every law judged by it is
upheld.1 9 The leniency of the standard is essentially the judiciary's
In matters such as economic
way of implementing deference.
regulation the courts believe they are ill-suited to play a vigorous
oversight role and thus allow the coordinate branches of government
20
wide latitude to determine the law.
For laws touching upon fundamental rights or discriminating
against racial minorities, Carolene Products suggested the possibility
of a more vigorous judicial role-a "more searching judicial scrutiny."
The Supreme Court first used the precise term "strict scrutiny" in
1942's Skinner v. Oklahoma, where the Court invalidated an
unusually harsh, early version of a "three strikes" law. 21 The
Oklahoma law at issue permitted the sterilization of persons convicted
of three crimes of moral turpitude but exempted those convicted of
other crimes. 22 After calling procreation "one of the basic civil rights
of man" 23 and detailing the inequality of Oklahoma's selective
sterilization, Justice William 0. Douglas's majority opinion explained
16. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53, n.4 (emphasis added).
17. In some ways, Carolene Products was less an introduction of the notion of exacting
constitutional scrutiny and more a change in focus in how such review would be applied. The
judiciary had long reviewed legislation by examining the asserted government purposes and the
reasonableness of the chosen means. During the Lochner era itself the Supreme Court employed
something akin to "exacting' scrutiny of economic legislation. The Lochner era Court required a
"reasonable relationship" between economic legislation and "some purpose within the
competency of the state"--language similar to today's rational basis test-while insisting upon
an acutely narrow view of what counted as a legitimate purpose. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 309 (1997). As a result, the Court
invalidated many economic laws adopted by Congress or the states. Id.
18. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (applying rational
basis to an economic classification).
19. See Gunther, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that rational basis review is "virtually none in
fact").
20. See Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 110.
21. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
22. Id. at 536-37.
23. Id. at 541.
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that "strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in
' 24
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.
Justice Douglas may have suspected that Oklahoma's discrimination
was anything but well intentioned; in the early twentieth century, the
"moral turpitude" label was often used to compound the stigma of
crimes disproportionately committed by racial minorities and the
25
poor.
The esteemed state court jurist Hans Linde, who clerked for
Justice Douglas, 26 appropriately recognized that terms like "strict
scrutiny" "were not systematically selected for clarity or logic," but
"first appeared in the opinions of judges who used them in the
ordinary course of making a point, not in order to frame a formal
rule." 27 Nevertheless, in the development of constitutional doctrine in
the decades after Skinner, Justice Douglas's phrase caught on and
eventually became increasingly formalized into a two "prong" test now
referred to as "strict scrutiny" or "compelling interest" analysis.
Courts first determine if the underlying governmental ends, or
objectives, are "compelling." According to Linde, "the Court uses
compelling in the vernacular to describe [the] societal importance" of
the government's reasons for enacting the challenged law. 28 Because
the government is impinging upon someone's core constitutional
rights, only the most pressing circumstances can justify the
government action. 29 If the governmental ends are compelling, the
courts then ask if the law is a narrowly tailored means of furthering
those governmental interests. Narrow tailoring requires that the law
capture within its reach no more activity (or less) than is necessary to
advance those compelling ends. An alternative phrasing is that the
law must be the "least restrictive alternative" available to pursue

24.

Id.

25. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama
constitutional provision disenfranchising individuals convicted of misdemeanors of "moral
turpitude" because of a racially invidious motive).
26. See Heather Davis, Dedication to Justice Hans A. Linde, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1139, 1139 n.1
(2001).
27. Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How: The Systemic Incoherence of
"Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.,

1993).
28. Id. at 221.
29. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (arguing that constitutional
rights are not absolutes and that "[p]ressing public necessity" may warrant interference).
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those ends. 30 This inquiry into "fit" between the ends and the means
enables courts to test the sincerity of the government's claimed
31
objective.
In the years following Skinner, the strict scrutiny standard
developed in the doctrines of free speech 32 and equal protection. 33 The
Supreme Court, in the 1943 case Murdock v. Pennsylvania, held that
the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech required that
invasive laws be "narrowly drawn." 34 A year after that, in Korematsu
v. United States, the Court held that racial classifications were
"immediately suspect" under the Equal Protection Clause. 35 After a
period of dormancy,3 6 strict scrutiny as a unique, identifiable test was
picked up in the late 1950s by the Warren Court, which expanded it
into new areas of law and rekindled it in the old. In NAACP v.
Alabama, the Court held that the government must have a compelling
interest to justify limitations on the freedom of association, 37 and in
Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to laws
burdening the free exercise of religion. 38 The Warren Court also
reaffirmed Skinner's principle of strict scrutiny for invasions of
fundamental rights in two 1969 decisions, Kramer v. Union Free
School District (right to vote) 39 and Shapiro v. Thomson (right to
travel).40

30. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest.").
31. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and TranscendingStrict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2420 (1996) ("A law's underinclusiveness-its failure to reach
all speech that implicates the interest-may be evidence that an interest is not compelling,
because it suggests that the government itself doesn't see the interest as compelling enough to
justify a broader statute.").
32. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and
Strict Scrutiny (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with .author) (arguing that strict scrutiny
arose primarily in free speech cases).
33. See generally Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese
Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2005) (tracing the
equal protection roots of strict scrutiny).
34. 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
35. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
36. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 255 (1991) (noting that it took years for the entire Court to adopt a presumptive rule
against racial classifications).
37. 357 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958).
38. 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
39. 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969).
40. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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B. Theories of Strict Scrutiny
The "more searching" scrutiny proposed in Carolene Products
invoked an unusual starting presumption for courts to take in a
limited set of controversies. Whereas separation of powers and
federalism concerns ordinarily lead courts to presume that
legislatures act within their powers and that legislation is
constitutionally valid, footnote four implied an alternative course in
core rights and discriminaticn cases. With laws encroaching upon
these rights, the "ordinary political processes" could not be trusted to
reach constitutionally legitimate results. 4 1
Thus, courts should
reverse their usual starting point by presuming such laws to be
unconstitutional and require the government to bear the burden of
42
defending the law.
Skinner pointed to one reason courts might mistrust the
political branches: legislation may be motivated by improper or
invidious purposes. 43 The notion that courts should police the political
process for improperly motivated legislation has become a prominent
justification for judicial application
of heightened review.
Constitutional theorist John Hart Ely, in his landmark book,
Democracy and Distrust, argued that "special scrutiny, in particular
its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of
'flushing out' unconstitutional motivation." 44 Cass Sunstein agrees,
arguing that strict scrutiny is designed to "ensurel that courts are
most skeptical in cases in which it is highly predictable that
illegitimate motives are at work." 45 The motive theory of strict
scrutiny has its most profound impact in equality cases, as exemplified
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's race discrimination opinions. "The
reasons for strict scrutiny are familiar," she wrote in Johnson v.
California.46 "Racial classifications raise special fears that they are
motivated by an invidious purpose." 47 Strict scrutiny is designed "to

41.

United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).

42.

Id.

43.

See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

44.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146

(1980).
45. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 6, 78 (1996). Elizabeth Anderson recently described strict scrutiny
under the equal protection guarantees as "the Court's way of operationalizing 'skepticism' about
the state's purposes. It offers a way of telling whether the state's purported legitimate purpose in
using a racial classification is a pretext for an invidious purpose." Elizabeth Anderson,
Integration,Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1230 (2002).
46. 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
47.

Id.
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'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the [government]
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool." 48 The hunt for improper motives has also animated
strict scrutiny in the First Amendment 49 and the fundamental rights
50
strand of equal protection.
An alternative justification of strict scrutiny invokes
heightened review as a means of providing vigorous judicial protection
for core rights while nevertheless pragmatically allowing "a safety
valve in the event of a 'hard case,' where the governmental and
societal reasons for infringing upon an individual right are
51
particularly strong (or in the language of the doctrine, 'compelling')."
Under this approach, the court weighs the costs of a law in terms of its
impact on individual rights against the law's benefits to society as a
whole. 52 But this is a weighted balancing, with a heavy thumb on the
scale in favor of the individual rights claimant, and the government is
unlikely to win absent especially pressing circumstances.
The
Supreme Court referred to this weighted balancing approach to strict
scrutiny in a recent free speech case. According to the Court, "the
First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment to protect
speech from government regulation through close judicial scrutiny,
thereby enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without imposing
judicial formulas so rigid that they become a straightjacket that
disables government from responding to serious problems." 53 To
insure that government's reasons are truly of sufficient magnitude to
warrant invasion of rights, the courts use narrow tailoring to police
against means that are overinclusive or underinclusive. A law with
poor fit-one that does not capture all like threats-suggests that the
government itself does not really believe the underlying ends are so
54
compelling.

48. Id. at 506 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
49. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211-14 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing to uphold a geographical electioneering ban under strict scrutiny because the speech
restriction was not the result of illegitimate legislative motivation).
50. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-42 (1942) (suggesting that improper
legislative motives were likely behind a law requiring sterilization for people convicted of crimes
of moral turpitude).
51. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN. L. REV. 961, 970 (1998).
52. See Siegel, supra note 32, at 82-84 (discussing the weighted cost-benefit theory of strict
scrutiny).
53. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996)
(describing this tradition after a long list of citations to landmark speech cases).
54. See Volokh, supra note 31, at 2420.
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The weighted balancing approach to strict scrutiny reflects a
compromise between two views of constitutional interpretation,
represented by Justices Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter
respectively. Black argued that constitutional rights should be read
as categorical rules that bar government from certain kinds of
activity. 55 Black famously insisted that the First Amendment's
command that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom56
of speech" meant "no law," "without any ifs, buts, or whereases.
Frankfurter, by contrast, believed that categorical absolutes unwisely
invited conflict between the judiciary and the elected branches. He
preferred instead a straightforward, even-handed balancing of the
interests. 57 But if Black's absolutist approach gave rights too much
protection, simple bimodal balancing offered too little. 58 Heightened
scrutiny was a compromise. Courts would not balance the relative
interests on equal terms nor categorically deny government the power
to touch core rights; certain laws would be presumed unconstitutional
and the government could only overcome that presumption by showing
that the laws were absolutely necessary given the circumstances.
In each of these two theories of strict scrutiny, 59 the standard
envisioned is strict but not inevitably fatal. Under the "smoke out"
theory of strict scrutiny, laws that are not based on improper purposes
55. See Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment 'Absolutes" A Public Interview,
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553, 559 (1962) (quoting Justice Black). For other notable articulations of
his absolutism, see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-71 (1941) (opinion by Black, J.);
Hugo L. Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960).
56. Cahn, supra note 55, at 553, 559.
57. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
For fuller accounts of the Black/Frankfurter debate, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 84-89 (1962). See generally
MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE
PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING (1984).
58. Some of the classic works on balancing versus categorical rules include T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); John H. Ely,
FlagDesecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
FirstAmendment, 72 YALE. L.J. 877, 912-16 (1963).
59. Social choice offers another justification for strict scrutiny, according to which the courts
police against legislation that would tend to reduce social welfare. My colleague Lynn Stout
explains that "statutes burdening rights courts describe as 'fundamental' tend to reduce average
welfare because legislative voting fails to account for the intense preference of those whose rights
are invaded, while statutes employing classifications deemed 'suspect' under the Equal
Protection Clause frequently serve redistributive rent-seeking. An independent judiciary that
strictly scrutinizes these statutes can protect against the welfare losses that flow from legislative
failure." Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry Into
FundamentalRights and Suspect Classifications,80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1789-90 (1992). The social
choice approach "implies that no right can be absolute. When the public interest is great enough,
a utilitarian calculus permits the state to intervene in even the most private decisions." Id.
at
1810.
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are supposed to survive review even if they burden core constitutional
rights. 60 A strict scrutiny that is always fatal cannot serve to smoke
out improper motives; such a rule effectively sets fire to the laws
themselves, invalidating them regardless of motive.
Under the
weighted balancing theory, the premise of heightened review is that,
sometimes, laws infringing on individual rights may be legitimate due
to unusually important countervailing interests. 6' In such cases, strict
scrutiny exists precisely to permit regulation where ordinarily none is
allowed.
C. The Rise of the Strict Scrutiny Myth
When Gunther penned his famous remark in 1972, only the
theory of strict scrutiny seemed strict. In the hands of the Warren
Court, heightened review certainly appeared to be outcome
determinative and always fatal. In a line of landmark decisions,
including Loving v. Virginia,62 Sherbert v. Verner,6 3 Kramer v. Union
Free School District,64 and Shapiro v. Thompson, 65 strict scrutiny was
used by the Warren Court to strike down a range of laws and expand
constitutional protections for individual rights. Although one preWarren Court case had upheld a law under heightened reviewKorematsu v. United States,66 upholding the exclusion of Japanese
residents from areas of the West Coast during World War II-that
case was easily categorized as an outlier occasioned by the war (or
67
worse, a terrible judicial error).
The 1971 term had marked a moment of transformation for the
Supreme Court as President Richard Nixon's two newest
appointments (Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Lewis Powell
Jr.) had just replaced Justices Black and John Marshall Harlan,
joining two earlier Nixon appointees (Chief Justice Warren Burger
and Justice Harry Blackmun). The bevy of Nixon appointees promised
60. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (noting that properly motivated laws
are capable of surviving strict scrutiny).
61. See Volokh, supra note 31, at 2427 (noting that limitations on free speech, for example,
may be acceptable when a government has extremely compelling interests in imposing such
restrictions).
62. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (invalidating state ban on miscegenation).
63. 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (invalidating a state law burdening the free exercise of
religion).
64. 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (invalidating a state law restricting the right to vote in school
district elections).
65. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (invalidating a state law restricting the right to travel).
66. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
67. See Klarman, supra note 36, at 232 n.83 (explaining Korematsu as a reflection of
deference to the military).
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a significant change in direction for the Court, as the liberal and
expansionist Warren Court turned to the potentially much more
conservative and restrained Burger Court. 68 One hallmark of the
Warren Court, according to Gunther, was its "embrace[]" of a "rigid
two-tier attitude" in equal protection cases. 69 "Some situations evoked
the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny that was 'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential 'old' equal
protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none
in fact. '70 In the early Burger Court equal protection cases, Gunther
discerned the beginnings of a "new trend": a continuation of
interventionist equal protection review, but one without resort to
strict scrutiny. 71 This "newer equal protection" would cease to
examine critically the asserted government ends, "concern[ing] itself
solely with means."72 Moreover, means that significantly furthered
whatever government purpose was alleged, but fell short of strict
73
scrutiny's requirement of narrow tailoring, would be permissible.
The rise of "intermediate" and other forms of relaxed scrutiny in the
ensuing years of the Burger Court proved the accuracy of Gunther's
prediction of a newer equal protection.
Yet it was Gunther's characterization of strict scrutiny as "fatal
in fact" that gained wide popularity. The phrase became "one of the
most quoted lines in legal literature,"74 and hundreds of law journal
articles and judicial opinions have repeated the quote. The Supreme
Court has cited Gunther approvingly, writing that "[o]nly rarely are
statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny .... [S]trict-scrutiny
75
review is 'strict' in theory but usually 'fatal' in fact."
Gunther's line is not just frequently quoted, it is widely
accepted by many as an accurate description of strict scrutiny.
Constitutional scholar Paul Kahn has written that "equal protection
law has essentially identified 'exacting' judicial scrutiny with judicial
invalidation. ' 76 As one recent constitutional law treatise teaches,
68. Gunther, supranote 1, at 5.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Id.
74. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther: The Man and the Scholar, 55 STAN. L. REV. 643,
645 (2002).
75. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (defining "conventional 'strict scrutiny"' as "scrutiny
that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
76. Paul Kahn, The Court, The Community, and the JudicialBalance: The Jurisprudenceof
Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1987).
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strict scrutiny "create[s] virtually insurmountable hurdles for the
government seeking to defend its classifications." 77 Jed Rubenfeld
agrees: "[Ihen a law burdens [a fundamental] right, it... triggers
78
strict scrutiny-which, as everyone knows, is almost always fatal."
Strict scrutiny, it is said, is a "death knell"79 : an "outcome
determinative"8 0 standard of review "virtually impossible for a law to
survive." ' According to another scholar, "[t]he subsequent evolution
82
of strict scrutiny confirmed the accuracy of the Gunther assessment"
of the standard as inevitably fatal. "[O]nce the Court sorts the case
into one or another constitutional bin [strict scrutiny or rational
basis], the outcome is virtually foreordained."8 3 Others insist "strict
scrutiny is essentially invoked, not employed. Despite its namestrict 'scrutiny'-it ordinarily amounts to a finding of invalidity, not a
tool of analysis."8 4 Except in the extremely rare case, "the actual
application" of the standard is "a rhetorical and mechanical
afterthought."85
Although Gunther's observation was based on his view of equal
protection doctrine, the "strict in theory, fatal in fact" label has often
been used to describe strict scrutiny in other areas of law, including
free speech doctrine8 6 and fundamental rights doctrine.8 7 Strict
scrutiny is widely perceived to be equally fatal in these areas of law.
According to Laurence Tribe, for example, "there are very few cases

77.

2 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 25.02,

at 8 (2d ed. 1997).
78. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1160 (2002);
see also Fallon, supra note 4, at 76 ("[The classification of legislation as either 'suspect' or
nonsuspect' is nearly always outcome-dispositive.").
79.

CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA 269 (2002).

80. Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment Implications of
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 160 (2001).
81. EVAN GERTSMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2004); see also
JACK N. RAKOVE, THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, at 172 (2003) (challenged law invalidated

"virtually every time").
82.

K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict Scrutiny, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 397, 404 (1997).

83. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 55 (1997).

84.
85.
86.

USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO

Rubin, supra note 2, at 4.
Wells, supra note 80, at 160.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, What If I Want My Kids to Watch Pornography?:Protecting

Children From Indecent Speech, 11 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671, 673 (2003); Daniel J. Solove,

The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy ProtectionsAgainst Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J.
967, 983 (2003); James Weinstein, DatabaseProtection and the First Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 305, 321 (2002).

87. See Kathleen Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing,63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1452 (2d ed. 1988).
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D. Recent Challenges to the Myth
There have been several recent challenges to the widely held
belief that strict scrutiny is an outcome determinative, always (or
nearly always) fatal test. Justice O'Connor's opinions in Adarand and
Grutter are perhaps the most recognizable arguments against
Gunther's view. In a more recent case, Johnson v. California,Justice
O'Connor once again argued that "[t]he fact that strict scrutiny applies
says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that
89
determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny."
O'Connor's challenge is not alone. A handful of legal scholars
have recently argued that, at least in equal protection doctrine, the
tiers of scrutiny are collapsing. 90 Some have commented that the
traditional outcome-determinative alternatives of rational basis
review and strict scrutiny are becoming less extreme, as reflected in a
number of high-profile Supreme Court decisions.
According to
Sunstein, "[t]he hard edges" of tiered review "have softened, and there
has been at least a modest convergence away from tiers and toward
general balancing of relevant interests." 9 1 Ashutosh Bhagwat agrees,
and argues that the softening of the traditionally extreme tiers of
scrutiny is due to a newfound willingness by the courts to undertake a
92
genuine scrutiny of governmental purposes.
The evidence of this softening comes from both sides of the
traditional tiers of scrutiny. On the strict scrutiny side, the evidence
for softening includes Adarand Constructors'claim that the test is not
necessarily fatal 93 and Grutter's subsequent implementation of lessthan-fatal strict scrutiny to law school affirmative action policies. On
the rational basis side, decisions such as Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,94 Romer v. Evans,95 and Lawrence v. Texas 96 apply an

88. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 1452.
89. 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (quotations omitted).
90. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalLaw, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 323-24 (1997); Robert E. Levy, In Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudenceof
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 418 n.385 (1995).
91. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 77.
92. See Bhagwat, supra note 90, at 299-304, 315.
93. Id. at 315.
94. 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating, under rational basis review, the application of a
zoning law to prevent the operation of a group home for the mentally disabled).
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uncharacteristically vigorous and skeptical version of that standard of
97
review-one that has been termed "rational basis with bite."
There is one area of law in which strict scrutiny has been
widely recognized to be less than fatal in practice: free exercise cases.
After the Supreme Court first applied strict scrutiny in the 1960s to
require the government to grant exemptions from generally applicable
laws to religious adherents, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts turned
away most claims for religious exemptions. In 1992, James Ryan
published an empirical study of free exercise cases decided by the
federal appellate and Supreme courts between 1980 and 1990.98 Ryan
found that exemption claims were denied in 87 percent of the cases (85
of 97),99 confirming the view expressed by other scholars that strict
scrutiny in free exercise cases was easily satisfied.1 00 Ryan's study
was limited to free exercise cases, but the high rate at which laws
survived strict scrutiny in those cases raises the question of how strict
this test is in other areas of law.

III. METHODOLOGY AND BASIC RESULTS
A. Methodology
The study consists of a comprehensive data set of reported
federal court opinions applying strict scrutiny from January 1990
95. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating, under rational basis review, a Colorado
constitutional provision that barred the enactment of laws protecting those discriminated
against on the basis of sexual orientation).
96. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law that criminalized same-sex sodomy
because it served no "legitimate" governmental interest).
97. See generally Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny By Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987); see also Gunther, supra note 1, at 18-19
(arguing that several "minimal scrutiny" cases applied a standard with "bite"). Cf. Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court has applied a "more
searching" form of rational basis review when adjudicating laws burdening personal
relationships). Lending empirical support to the thesis that the traditional tiers are softening is
Robert Farrell's study of Supreme Court rational basis decisions between 1973 and May 1996,
which found that 10% of the applications of that test resulted in the law being invalidated. See
Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court From the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 417-18 App. (1999).
98. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
IconoclasticAssessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 (1992).
99. Id. at 1417.
100. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 55 (1995); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110,
1127 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing, and Government Interests, in
PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 241, 246 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
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through 2003. To identify all the strict scrutiny appliers, an initial list
of over 4,000 cases was compiled using Westlaw searches of published
federal courts decisions that mentioned "strict scrutiny," "exacting
scrutiny," or other potential formulations of the standard. 10 1 Each
opinion identified was read to determine if it applied strict scrutiny.
For the vast majority of opinions, this was a simple matter of reading
the case and seeing whether the court wrote that it was applying
"strict scrutiny" or judging a law to determine whether it was
"narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." In
a few cases, the courts expressed uncertainty about the applicable
standard of review and held, as an alternative basis for the decision,
that the law survived or failed review under strict scrutiny. These
alternate holdings, though arguably dicta, were counted as strict
scrutiny appliers in order to gain the most comprehensive picture of
judicial practice.
The corpus of strict scrutiny decisions came from five basic
doctrines: freedom of speech, religious liberty, suspect class
discrimination, fundamental rights/substantive due process, and
freedom of association. Other areas of law that borrow from the strict
scrutiny standard but depart from it in some way were excluded. For
example, in dormant commerce clause cases, courts sometimes claim
to apply the "strictest scrutiny" but define that test as explicitly
mandating only "legitimate" (but not "compelling") government
interests.10 2 Only decisions that purported to apply the traditional
compelling interest/narrowly tailored version of strict scrutiny were
included.
The period of 1990 through 2003 was chosen for theoretical and
practical reasons.
Limited resources and the large number of
decisions that had to be read necessitated some line drawing, but this
particular period was chosen because it provided a sufficiently large
group of decisions from each circuit and in each area of doctrine from
which reliable inferences could be drawn. A shorter period would
limit the number of observations, and a much longer period of studysay, going back to the origins of strict scrutiny in mid-century-would
present the dilemma of how to code decisions that are ambiguous
101. Westlaw query for "da(1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2002 2003) & "strict scrutiny" "strictest scrutiny" "exacting scrutiny" ((compelling /2 interest) /s
(narrow! "least restrictive"))" in the All Federal Cases database, conducted on September 24,
2004.
102. See, e.g., Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying the "strictest
scrutiny" but requiring a 'legitimate" interest in the dormant commerce clause context).
Although I did not collect data on dormant commerce clause decisions, many were encountered
while conducting the research for this Article and few (if any) survivors were found. Not all
scrutiny has to be "strict" to be vigorous.
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about the standard they apply. In the 1960s and '70s, many opinions
that are now widely thought to use strict scrutiny did not employ that
precise terminology nor even refer to the two prongs in any kind of
systematic way. 10 3 By 1990, however, the norm of identifying with
specificity the applicable standard and applying it in a more or less
straightforward, structured fashion was well established. Moreover,
the time period examined is relatively recent, offering a perspective on
how strict scrutiny is currently applied in the federal courts as a
matter of practice-rather than how strict scrutiny was applied
historically.
The data set includes all published 10 4 federal court decisions
applying strict scrutiny in a final ruling on the merits. Preliminary
injunction cases and decisions that were subsequently reversed or
affirmed on appeal in a published opinion were collected but, unless
otherwise specified, were excluded from the reported results. The
total number of strict scrutiny applications in final, published rulings
on the merits was 459.
The data set was compiled with the flexibility to analyze strict
scrutiny applications at two levels: the application level and the judge
level. The application level data treats each judicial decision applying
strict scrutiny as a single observation, regardless of the number of
judges on the panel. Where a court adjudicated more than one
provision under strict scrutiny in the same case, each application of
strict scrutiny was treated as a distinct observation. This is the level
of analysis that supports most of the empirical results in this Article.
The judge level data, which is only used here in tests of potential
correlations between political ideology and strict scrutiny, reports
each judicial vote on a strict scrutiny application as a single
observation. 10 5 Thus, for that same hypothetical circuit court decision

103. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (applying what is now widely
recognized as strict scrutiny even though the Court only required a "permissible"-rather than
"compelling"-governmental interest); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640, 646 (1948)
(invalidating racially discriminatory state law under a partial strict scrutiny analysis that looked
to the compelling importance of the governmental ends but without any formal analysis of means
fit).
104. Some applications of strict scrutiny necessarily evaded the data set by the decision to
focus only on published opinions. Courts that applied strict scrutiny without authoring an
opinion and/or triggering an appeal that would result in an opinion were not captured by my
research. This may skew the data and undercount strict scrutiny survivors. Assuming that a
court is more likely to publish an opinion when it overturns a law than when it upholds one, we
would expect the universe of unpublished strict scrutiny applications to be disproportionately
survivors. In turn, the universe of published applications will be disproportionately fatalities.
105. Each judicial vote on a discrete legal issue requiring strict scrutiny analysis was treated
individually. In some cases, there were multiple, distinct legal issues voted upon in a decision
and each vote was counted as a separate observation.
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referenced above, each of the three judges would be treated as a
separate observation. In addition, where judicial votes are being
studied, the data set allows the inclusion of published lower court
strict scrutiny decisions that were later the subject of subsequent
published rulings on the same law, although these non-final decisions
Unless otherwise
are excluded from the application-level data.
specified, the results reported are based on the application-level data
and include only final rulings on the merits.
A final point of clarification is in order. The purpose of this
study is to examine how courts and judges apply strict scrutiny; it is
not to determine how strict scrutiny might affect litigants, legislators,
or others. Determining how strict scrutiny impacts the decision of
lawmakers to adopt laws or encourages or discourages litigants to
bring, settle, or appeal lawsuits is not the goal. The exclusive focus
here is on how courts and judges apply strict scrutiny and the
variables associated with strict scrutiny survival.
B. The O'Connor Hypothesis: Strict Scrutiny is not Fatal in Fact
The first hypothesis subjected to empirical verification is that
strict scrutiny is not really fatal in fact. Because of the free exercise
cases studied by Ryan and a few other high-profile decisions such as
Grutter and Korematsu, it is already apparent that some decisions
uphold laws while applying strict scrutiny. Therefore, we could
determine that, as a purely descriptive matter, strict scrutiny is not
always fatal without looking further. But the more interesting
question is whether the free exercise cases, Grutter, and Korematsu
are merely outliers and that, elsewhere in constitutional adjudication,
strict scrutiny is fatal in all (or nearly all) cases. If the courts
invalidate nearly every law under strict scrutiny save for these
outliers, then one might still conclude that strict scrutiny is effectively
fatal in fact. On this basis, a null hypothesis can be proposed: if only a
small percentage of laws survive strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny is
The precise percentage cutoff is
as Gunther characterized it.
somewhat arbitrary, but a fair number might be a single digit survival
rate: If less than 10 percent of applications result in the law being
upheld, then strict scrutiny is practically speaking fatal.
To determine if strict scrutiny is fatal in fact, a simple
descriptive statistic of the number of survivors and fatalities was
employed. For this statistic, the application-level observations were
used. There were 459 applications of strict scrutiny in published final
Of those 459
rulings on the merits during the covered period.
applications, there were 322 applications that resulted in invalidation
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and 137 applications that upheld the challenged laws. This amounts
to a survival rate of 30 percent. This rate is high enough to conclude
that in the aggregate strict scrutiny is not inevitably, or even in the
overwhelming number of cases, fatal in fact. Almost one in three
applications of strict scrutiny upheld the challenged law.
The aggregate data, however, include strict scrutiny
applications across five basic doctrines: freedom of speech, freedom of
association, religious liberty, fundamental rights, and suspect class
discrimination. Based on the Ryan study of religious liberty decisions
in the 1980s, one may suspect that strict scrutiny survival rates may
vary by doctrine. Moreover, it is conceivable that the 30 percent
survival rate is propelled primarily by religious liberty cases. If the
religious liberty cases are removed and the strict scrutiny survival
rate drops to below 10 percent, then perhaps strict scrutiny really is
fatal in fact everywhere but in religious liberty cases. Removing all of
the religious liberty cases, however, results in a drop in the strict
scrutiny survival rate to only 24 percent. 10 6 Strict scrutiny is stricter
outside of religious liberty cases, but it is still far from fatal in fact.
Across constitutional law, strict scrutiny is survivable.
Based on the high survival rate of strict scrutiny, both with
and without the religious liberty cases factored in, it appears that
Grutter and Korematsu are not outliers. Instead, they are the tips of
an iceberg, the most visible signs of a larger body of strict scrutiny
decisions that uphold laws under even this most rigorous and exacting
standard of review.

106. One interesting question, although beyond the scope of this study, is why we do not find
something closer to a 50% rate, as might be expected in light of the famous Priest-Klein
"selection effect" hypothesis. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984) (arguing that because only "close" cases
will ordinarily be pursued through final adjudication, with others controversies settling prior to
trial or never being brought, plaintiffs should win approximately 50% of litigated cases
regardless of the substantive standard or legal rule). Although there has been considerable
research on the Priest-Klein hypothesis, most of it looks at private rather than constitutional
litigation. For exemplary studies, see Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Keith N. Hylton,
Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187
(1993); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569 (2001); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection
Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209
(1995). The selection effect in strict scrutiny cases is examined more thoroughly in Craig
Countryman & Adam Winkler, Fundamental Rights and the Selection Effect (2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).

814

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:793

IV. CONTEXTUAL STRICT SCRUTINY

In Grutter, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion insisted that,
even where strict scrutiny applies, "[c]ontext matters."'10 7 Strict
scrutiny, she wrote, "must take relevant differences into account....
[S]trict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced by
108
the governmental decisionmaker ... in that particular context."
This Part offers a macro-level examination of the strict scrutiny data
to consider a series of questions related to the extent to which context
matters in strict scrutiny review. How does strict scrutiny vary
among the different areas of law in which that standard is found? Is
the type of governmental actor behind a challenged law a relevant
difference? Do courts treat educational institutions differently than
other institutions or treat federal laws to more or less deferential
review than state laws? Does a law's likelihood of being upheld
depend at all on the level of court called upon to decide the issue?
These and other factors are considered. This Part concludes by
estimating the parameters of a regression model designed to account
for which variables are significantly tied to strict scrutiny outcomes.
A. The Identity of the Right
Strict scrutiny is regularly overcome in each of the five
constitutional rights in which the standard is used. This Section
considers if all rights trigger an equally protective version of strict
scrutiny. The discussion so far has already revealed that one area of
law, religious liberty, has a particularly weak version of strict scrutiny
under which the majority of challenged laws are upheld. Is there any
discernible variation in strict scrutiny's "strictness" in other areas of
law?
Table 1 reports the strict scrutiny survival rate by right, along
with the results of a statistical test designed to measure whether the
variation in the survival rate is significant.

107. 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2002).
108. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Table 1. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Right
Right

Survival Rate

Applications (N)

Religious Liberty

59%

73

Freedom of Association

33%

33

Suspect Class Discrimination

27%

85

Fundamental Rights

24%

46

Freedom of Speech

22%

222

Total

30%

459

F = 9.988, DF = 4, p < .000

Strict scrutiny survival is correlated with doctrine at a
statistically significant rate (p < .000). In other words, the doctrine in
which a case arises impacts the likelihood that the underlying law will
be upheld. Strict scrutiny is clearly survivable in religious liberty
cases, where 59 percent of applications result in the law being upheld.
This is consistent with the received wisdom of religious liberty
scrutiny being relatively easy to satisfy. Thirty-three (33) percent of
applications to laws alleged to infringe upon the freedom of association
were survivors. In suspect class discrimination cases, strict scrutiny
was satisfied in 27 percent, while in fundamental rights cases the
survival rate was 24 percent. Strict scrutiny was most fatal in free
speech cases, where only 22 percent of challenged laws survived.
None of the constitutional rights triggers a truly fatal-in-fact form of
strict scrutiny, and the survival rate in every right is in excess of 20
percent. These figures are consistent with a form of review that is
difficult, but not impossible, to overcome.
Although each right has its own survival rate, further
examination suggests that the significant variation is limited to
religious liberty decisions, as compared to all others. Outside of
religious liberty, the rate at which laws survive strict scrutiny review
is more or less consistent-all within the range of 22-33 percent. If
the religious liberty cases are removed from the analysis, no
statistically significant variation in survival rates among the doctrines
remains (p = .494). Strict scrutiny is equally "strict" in free speech,
association, fundamental rights/due process, and suspect class
discrimination cases.
The identity of the constitutional right,
therefore, appears to make a difference in the likelihood a law will
survive strict scrutiny only as it compares religious liberty to all other
constitutional rights.
The scrutiny applied to religious liberty
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infringements resembles some form of intermediate (or more
deferential) scrutiny.
Part V will return to the question of how strict scrutiny varies
among doctrines and detail the types of laws that survive or fail in
each area of law. For now, it is enough to recognize an apparently
important variation in strict scrutiny's deadliness between religious
liberty cases, on the one hand, and all other rights on the other.
B. EnactingInstitution
Another potentially useful way to examine strict scrutiny in
practice is to consider whether judges evaluate laws adopted by
different governmental actors with the same degree of skepticism.
Courts are asked to consider the constitutionality of policies and laws
adopted by a host of governmental institutions, from Congress and
state legislatures to executive agencies and local government officials.
Some cases involve policies adopted by prisons, others by educational
institutions, and still others by federal judges themselves. Is each of
these governmental institutions subject to the same degree of
suspicion, or are federal judges prone to defer to some and to more
strictly scrutinize the actions of others?
In a series of articles, Frederick Schauer has argued that our
understanding of free speech would be enhanced by focusing on the
institutional context in which the speech arises. 0 9 Rather than
treating all speakers as the "same," First Amendment doctrine might
better serve the underlying rationales of the free speech guarantee if
courts paid attention to "lines of institutional differentiation." 110
According to Schauer, "[i]nstitutional specificity and institutional
differentiation are a reality of modern life, and this reality is reflected,
as elsewhere, in the institutions relevant to free speech
adjudication.""'
"[W]e might also trust [courts] to recognize the
difference between the institutional press and the lone pamphleteer,
between the Internet and an adult theater, between libraries and
medical clinics, and between the National Endowment for the Arts
and the National Institutes of Health."1 2 Schauer's suggestion for the

109. See generally Frederick Schauer, Principles,Institutions, and the FirstAmendment, 112
HARv. L. REV. 84 (1998) [hereinafter Institutions]; Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes,
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999); Frederick
Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirst Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) [hereinafter
InstitutionalFirst Amendment].
110. Schauer, InstitutionalFirstAmendment, supra note 109, at 1260.
111. Schauer, Institutions,supra note 109, at 113-14.
112. Schauer, InstitutionalFirstAmendment, supra note 109, at 1260.
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First Amendment also has potential salience for how one might view
other areas of constitutional doctrine. Indeed, it may be that courts
are already silently attuned to institutional context when they apply a
test such as strict scrutiny, even if the test itself is ostensibly blind to
the identity of the governmental actor.
1. Survival Rate by Institution
To see whether courts treat different governmental actors with
differing levels of skepticism, all of the strict scrutiny applications
were coded for the governmental institution that enacted the law at
issue. The variables chosen were much broader than those suggested
by Schauer as this test was not designed to substantiate Schauer's
particular claims but rather to build on his notion of institutional
specificity more generally. Table 2 reports the strict scrutiny survival
rate by governmental actor that adopted the challenged policy or law
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Table 2. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Governmental Institution
EnactingInstitution

Survival Rate

Applications (N)

Penal Institutions 113

74%

27

58%

38

Congress

49%

43

Federal Agency"1 5

45%

29

23%

145

14%

14

Educational Institution 118

20%

35

Local Government" 9

15%

118

10%

10

30%

459

Judiciary"

4

State Legislature/Constitution
State Agency

Other

17

20

Total

16

F = 10.227, DF = 8, p < .000

Strict scrutiny survival rates vary significantly by enacting
governmental institution (p < .000).
Penal institution policies
subjected to strict scrutiny survive in a remarkably high percentage of
applications, 74 percent. Judicial orders alleged to violate core rights
have a survival rate of 58 percent. Laws adopted by Congress (49%)
and federal administrative agency regulations (45%) survive nearly
half the time.
State legislative enactments and constitutional
provisions survive much less frequently than federal laws, at 23
percent. Strict scrutiny as applied to educational institutions, such as
universities, public schools, and libraries is fatal in all but 20 percent

113. Penal Institutions includes both federal and state prisons and related institutions.
114. Judiciary includes court orders, injunctions, and consent decrees put in place by courts.
115. Federal Agency includes all federal executive branch agencies, except prisons.
116. State Legislature/Constitution includes state legislative enactments and constitutional
provisions.
117. State Administrative Agency includes all state executive agencies, except prisons and
educational institutions.
118. Educational Institutions includes public schools, colleges, universities, and libraries.
Library cases were too few in number (3 total, all fatalities) to warrant treatment as a unique
variable.
119. Local Government includes municipal and county governmental actors, excluding
educational institutions.
120. Other included private entities that were deemed to be state actors (such as unions),
and state bars.
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of observed applications. State administrative agencies (14%), local
governmental entities (15%), and other governmental actors (10%)
fare even worse. These last types of governmental institutions face a
scrutiny that is nearly always fatal.
Courts seem to be extremely deferential to penal institutions,
upholding state and federal prison polices in 3 of every 4 applications.
What explains this high survival rate? First, the prison cases are
overwhelmingly religious liberty cases, where strict scrutiny is the
least fatal (59%). Moreover, as will be shown in the later discussion of
religious liberty, the prison cases involve free exercise exemption
claims where strict scrutiny is especially weak. To the extent that
penal institutions, as such, impact strict scrutiny analysis-and the
regression models estimated later show that penal institutions are
statistically correlated with strict scrutiny survival even controlling
for their origin in religious liberty cases-one part of the explanation
may be creeping deference. Courts are famously unwilling to oversee
prison policies with too demanding an eye for fear of interfering with
the security of inmates and prison personnel. Under the doctrine
articulated by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, courts usually
apply an extremely low level of scrutiny to prison policies that infringe
on inmates' constitutional rights, requiring merely that the policies be
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."12 1 As Turner
explained, "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to
an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their
ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative
' 122
solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration."
Turner's standard does not formally apply to the laws captured by this
data set; the prison decisions here all apply strict scrutiny. But even
where courts apply this supposedly rigorous standard of review, the
underlying rationale of Turner may still exert some gravitational pull
on judicial decisionmaking toward deference.
The federal judiciary also tends to be relatively deferential to
other judicial actors, upholding judicial orders under strict scrutiny at
a rate of 58 percent. (All but one of the judicial orders in the data set
were adopted by federal courts.) That judges would be more respectful
of court rulings in general makes perfect sense. To the extent that
strict scrutiny is designed to ferret out improper purposes and
overreaching laws, one might presume that federal judges would trust
other federal judges more than other governmental actors. One would

121. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
122. Id.
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expect judges to permit other judges greater discretion based on their
presumed expertise and commonality of interests.
Educational institutions are among those one might expect
courts to approach with a measure of deference. As Schauer posits,
colleges and universities can be thought of as "appropriate areas for
highly (externally) unregulated inquiry" because "special immunity"
here "would in the large serve important purposes of inquiry and
knowledge acquisition."'1 23 Indeed, in several decisions, the federal
courts have argued that educators have expertise that warrants at
least some hesitancy on the part of courts to second-guess educational
policies, even where strict scrutiny formally applies. In Hunter v.
Regents of the University of California, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the partially race-based admissions policy of an
innovative public laboratory school (run by the author's home
institution, UCLA) under strict scrutiny. 124 The school considered
race in admissions to create a sample population with similar
125
demographics as the typical urban public school in California.
"[C]ourts should defer to researchers' decisions about what they need
for their research," the Ninth Circuit explained, citing to the Supreme
Court's statement that "judges ...asked to review the substance of a
genuinely academic decision ... should show great respect for the
faculty's professional judgment."' 26 A similar approach was taken in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 2 7 where the Supreme Court explained that
educational institutions "occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition" and enjoy "educational autonomy" to make their "own
judgments" about which students will help in the "fulfillment of [their]
mission. 1 28 Therefore, a law school's "educational judgment that...
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer."1 29 Both Hunter and Grutter were nevertheless explicit that
they were applying "strict scrutiny." These opinions were examples of
"strict scrutiny schizophrenia": they pledge adherence to both
deference and skeptical scrutiny.
Hunter and Grutter are unusual, however, in that they actually
defer to educators.
Under strict scrutiny, courts are relatively

123. Schauer, InstitutionalFirst Amendment, supra note 109, at 1274-75.
124. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 1066.
126. Id. (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990)).
127. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
128. Id. at 330 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978)).
129. Id. at 328; see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A CriticalAnalysis, 41
Hous. L. REV. 459, 470 (2004) ("Four paragraphs into the analytical section of the opinion, the
continuous drumbeat of deference, deference, deference rings out loud and clear.").
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unlikely to uphold a challenged educational institution rule or policy.
The survival rate for educational institutions under strict scrutiny is
only 20 percent-not fatal, but still lower than most other types of
institutions whose acts were adjudicated under the same standard. If
the educational institution variable is broken down, policies adopted
by public elementary and high schools survive at a slightly lower rate
(17%), and university policies survive at a level (29%) slightly higher
than the aggregate survival rate of all strict scrutiny cases. From
these data, it appears that courts do not show any unusual deference
to educational institutions when applying strict scrutiny.
2. The Importance of Federalism
In a recent article, Mark Rosen argues that courts should not
apply constitutional principles "identically to all levels of
government." 130
Rather, courts should "tailor" constitutional
' 131
principles to "apply differently to different levels of government."
According to Rosen, "[s]ensitivity to what level of government is
acting... is critical because the different levels of government are
sufficiently dissimilar that a particular limitation as applied to one
132
may have very different repercussions when applied to another."
The type of "tailoring" most commonly recognized is when the courts
apply different standards of review to different governmental actors,
such as strict scrutiny for laws enacted by the federal government and
intermediate or rational basis scrutiny for state laws.1 3 3 But tailoring
can also occur when the courts apply the same standard of review. As
shown earlier, the same strict scrutiny test varies in its strictness
depending upon the governmental actor behind the law.
One of the most striking and powerful patterns in the strict
scrutiny data is how federal governmental actors fare compared to
state and local governmental actors. Federal actors, such as Congress,
the federal judiciary, and federal agencies are much more likely to
have their laws upheld than state and local governmental actors.
Table 3 collapses the enacting institution variables into three larger
ones to represent all federal laws, all state laws, and all local laws.

130. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005).

131. Id.
132. Id. at 1520.
133. See id. at 1526, 1536-37. Rosen also describes tailoring that occurs through the
development of doctrine after the choice of standard has been made, what he terms a "Rulified
Standard." Id. at 1526.
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Table 3. Federalism and Strict Scrutiny Survival
Level of Government
Survival Rate
Applications (N)
Federal 134

50%

112

State 135

29%

191

Local 136

17%

156

Total

30%

459

F= 18.886, DF= 2, p < .000
It appears that federal judges are relatively deferential to
federal laws and relatively skeptical of state and, to an even greater
extent, local actors (p < .000).137 Strict scrutiny is much more fatal to
local laws (17% survival rate) than it is to state laws (29% survival
rate), which in turn are much less likely to survive review than federal
laws (50%). This remarkable difference occurs despite the fact that no
current debate exists about the role of federalism in strict scrutiny
analysis.
Perhaps the linear descent in survival rates as one moves from
the national to the local level is a reflection of Madison's theory of
faction. As Madison wrote, "The smaller the society, the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it...
[and] the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression." 13 In a larger polity, such as the federal government, "a
greater variety of parties and interests ...make it less probable that
a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens." 139 If faction is to be feared on the state and
local level, but not as much on the federal level, courts might approach
134. Federal included acts of Congress, federal administrative agency regulations (including
federal penal institutions), and orders of federal courts.
135. State included all state legislation, state constitutions, state court orders, and state
agency action. Note that, unlike in Table 2, State here includes state penal institutions.
136. Local included all laws or government actions taken by governments at the county level
and smaller. Note that, unlike in Table 2, Local here includes educational institutions.
137. 'Tailoring" might be understood in two different ways, only one of which is suggested by
the strict scrutiny cases. One form of tailoring would be for the courts to uphold law x enacted by
the federal government and reject the same law if enacted by a state. A second, more subtle form
of tailoring is the implementation of an extra degree of deference to the federal government visa-vis the states.
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
139. Id. For an insightful argument that courts to apply relative deference to federal laws as
compared to state laws on the basis of Madison's theory of faction, see Norman Williams, Note,
Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963
(1994).
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state and local laws with relatively greater skepticism and distrust.
Moreover, even with equal degrees of skepticism, the relative
susceptibility of different governmental entities to faction's influence
means that local governments are more likely to adopt laws that are
unconstitutional. The federal government, under this view, is less
likely to be motivated by impermissible motives that need to be
"smoked out," even if the underlying right remains protected by a
formal strict scrutiny standard.
In any event, federal laws clearly survive more frequently than
state and, especially local, laws. If strict scrutiny is designed to take
relevant differences into account, one difference that appears to
matter considerably to federal judges is federalism, understood
broadly to refer to all the different levels of government, including
local governments.
C. Time Trend
As noted earlier, several scholars have recently challenged the
myth of strict scrutiny's deadliness, opining that the traditionally
rigid tiers of scrutiny have been softening. In recognition of the
finding that strict scrutiny is satisfied in 30 percent of applications,
one may be tempted to conclude that these scholars are correct.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's insistence in 1995's Adarand
Constructors v. Pena that strict scrutiny is not inevitably fatal to
challenged laws 140 may have influenced courts to apply strict scrutiny
less strictly in the years subsequent to that decision.
For these reasons, one might pose two related hypotheses.
First, strict scrutiny is becoming less fatal, or easier to satisfy, over
time. Second, the coordinating force of the Supreme Court has led
courts to apply strict scrutiny in a less deadly way after 1995, when
Adarand was decided. To test these two hypotheses, one can calculate
the strict scrutiny survival rate by year over the fourteen years
covered by the data set. If the survival rate increases, one can
surmise that strict scrutiny is becoming easier to satisfy and that at
least this tier's traditional rigidity is softening. For the second
hypothesis, one should find that strict scrutiny survival rate rose after
1995.
Figure 1 plots the strict scrutiny survival rate for every year
between 1990 and 2003. The trend line charts a three-year moving
average-that is, the mean survival rate over the previous three
years.
140. 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
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Figure 1. Strict Scrutiny Survival Rate by Year
(With 3-Year Moving Average), 1990 - 2003
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The judicial practice of applying strict scrutiny contradicts both
hypotheses. Strict scrutiny is not becoming easier to satisfy; rather it
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is apparently becoming more fatal. Between 1990 and 1992, the mean
survival rate by year was just over 40 percent. Between 2001 and
2003, by contrast, the mean survival rate had been cut in half, to 20
percent. The difference is especially stark if one compares 1992,
where the survival rate was 48 percent, 141 to 2002, where the survival
rate was 8 percent. 142 Strict scrutiny appears to be more difficult to
overcome currently than it was over a decade ago.
In terms of softening, the data here are limited because they
only extend back to 1990, and one can only speculate what the
survival rate was in earlier years. It could be that strict scrutiny in
the 1970s and 1980s was very fatal until a spike in the survival rate
in the early 1990s. Or it could be that strict scrutiny was never all
that fatal in the federal courts, despite the appearance given by the
Warren Court's strict scrutiny decisions. At least for the time period
covered by my study, strict scrutiny is becoming more difficult for laws
to satisfy.
The data are inconsistent with the hypothesis that courts were
influenced to apply strict scrutiny in a less deadly fashion by the
Supreme Court's announcement of strict scrutiny's survivability in
Adarand. In fact, the data show no spike in strict scrutiny survival
rates after 1995, but rather a steep decline in the likelihood of a law's
43
being upheld. In 1995 and 1996, the survival rate was 41 percent
and 46 percent 144 respectively. By 1997 and 1998, however, the strict
45 and 21 percent 46
scrutiny survival rate dropped to 23 percent
respectively. And, as noted, the survival rate has been dropping more
or less consistently ever since. Although Adarand has received much
attention for its rejection of the Gunther myth, the lower courts have
not been inspired by that decision to water down their scrutiny. On
the contrary, their scrutiny has surprisingly hardened.
D. Level of Court
Do district courts apply strict scrutiny more or less leniently
than the circuit courts of appeal, and how does each compare with the
Supreme Court? The Supreme Court receives the most attention from
legal scholars, and so its application of strict scrutiny likely plays an
inordinate role in shaping lawyers' understandings of strict scrutiny.
141. N = 21.
142. N = 38.
143. N = 29.

144. N = 43.
145. N = 35.
146. N = 42.
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Recall that when Gunther first referred to "fatal in fact," he was
reflecting on the Warren Court's use of heightened scrutiny. In
addition, recent scholarly challenges to the Gunther myth arguing
that the tiers of scrutiny are softening may also be largely informed by
Supreme Court opinions, such as Adarand and Grutter. Yet, the
Supreme Court uses strict scrutiny infrequently; between 1990 and
2003, 12 Supreme Court decisions applied strict scrutiny. By contrast,
in that same period, the federal district courts applied strict scrutiny
248 times in final rulings and the circuit courts of appeal used the
standard 199 times. 147 The true survival rate of strict scrutiny in
practice is determined by looking at the lower courts, rather than at
just the more studied Supreme Court.
Table 4 reports the strict scrutiny survival rate by level of
court.
Table 4. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Level of Court
Level of Court

Survival Rate

Applications (N)

Supreme Court

25%

12

Circuit Court

39%

199

District Court

23%

248

Total

30%

459

F= 6.725, DF=2, p = .001
Strict scrutiny survival rates do vary significantly by level of
court (p = .001). Although the Supreme Court (25%) and the district
courts (23%) uphold laws at similar rates, the circuit courts of appeal
are much more likely to uphold a law (39%).
It is unclear what accounts for this difference, although one
possibility is that the circuit courts hear more hard, or close, cases
than the district courts. Such controversies are relatively likely to be
pursued by litigants up through the appellate process because the
outcome is unclear. Easier cases where the law more clearly favors
one side or the other are more likely to end at the district court. The
25 percent survival rate at the Supreme Court, however, poses a
challenge to this hypothesis, and one might otherwise expect the
Court to hover closer to 50 percent if the Court primarily granted
review to the relatively hardest cases.
Yet, the number of

147. The number of district and circuit court applications reported here excludes non-final
rulings, where the same legal question was analyzed under strict scrutiny by a higher court in a
subsequent published opinion.
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observations at the Supreme Court level is very small and only one or
two decisions going the other way would raise the survival rate
considerably. Thus, the figure for the survival rate at the Supreme
Court is not especially robust.
One way to test if the identified variation might be due in part
to the relative difficultly of the underlying legal question is to compare
the strict scrutiny survival rate in final district court decisions with
district court decisions that were subsequently ruled on by the
appellate courts. This latter group of decisions obviously involves the
exact same laws ruled on by the circuit courts in their final decisions.
If the legal questions that are appealed are relatively hard, then one
would expect the survival rate in those cases to be higher than in
district court rulings that were not appealed. This is precisely the
pattern of the data. The survival rate in the non-final district court
50 percent greater than the
rulings was 34 percent 14 8-almost
survival rate in final district court rulings and much closer to the 39
percent survival rate witnessed in the circuit courts of appeal.
Consequently, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
harder cases are more likely to be appealed. If so, then the variation
may be attributable to the difficulty of the case rather than the level of
court per se.
E. Other Variables Considered
A number of other variables were examined to see if they
correlated with strict scrutiny outcomes, but the results were
negative: (1) region of the country; (2) circuit; (3) whether the case
involved minor children; (4) whether the law was election-related; and
(5) whether the law was related to law enforcement needs. None of
these factors revealed any apparent relationship to strict scrutiny
survival.
One notable variable with little discernible impact on strict
scrutiny is the political ideology of the deciding judge. In a recent
empirical study, Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Micelle
Ellman argue that a federal judge's political ideology-gauged by the
proxy of the appointing president's party-is closely correlated with
how she votes in many important areas of law, including
environmental law, sexual harassment, affirmative action, campaign

148. N = 117 (40 survivors, 77 fatalities). Note that not all district court decisions that were
subsequently adjudicated by the court of appeals were reported. The data here only include
reported district court decisions. Moreover, the results of this comparison are generally
consistent with the Priest-Klein selection effects hypothesis discussed supranote 106.
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finance, and disability discrimination. 1 49 One might therefore surmise
that political ideology would influence judicial voting in strict scrutiny
cases, where our most fundamental (and often most contested) rights
are at stake. Indeed, there is some overlap between the areas of law
that receive strict scrutiny and those studied by Sunstein, et al. Yet,
in the aggregate, there was no statistically significant difference in
strict scrutiny voting by political ideology-that is, Republican
appointed judges were no more likely to invalidate laws than judges
appointed by Democrats. Moreover, there was no variation in survival
rates along ideological lines in most of the discrete areas of law
covered by strict scrutiny, including freedom of speech (both generally
and in particular speech doctrines, such as campaign finance and
indecency cases), religious liberty, and freedom of association. The
areas of law with apparent ideological differences in survival rates
were suspect class discrimination (which is almost entirely comprised
of affirmative action cases) and fundamental rights cases (although
here the correlation is too weak to support any strong inferences).
These two areas in which political ideology may play a role in judicial
decisionmaking are discussed further in the doctrine-by-doctrine
analysis offered in Part V.
F. Modeling Strict Scrutiny
The discussion so far suggests a set of potential determinants
of strict scrutiny survival: (1) the identity of the right, at least
between religious liberty and all other rights; (2) the court in which
the application takes place, with circuit courts applying potentially
more lenient review; (3) the government institution that enacted the
challenged law, with stark differences especially along federalism
lines; and (4) the year in which the decision was rendered, with more
recent courts applying a more fatal version of the test than courts did
in the early 1990s.
To verify the relationship between these factors and strict
scrutiny survival, the data were analyzed with multivariate logistic
regression. Four models were estimated, each with the dependent

149. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts ofAppeals: A PreliminaryInvestigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 319-22 (2004). For a
classic work on how judicial attitudes impact voting, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Significant challenges have been

made to the attitudinal model in the political science literature. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997) (arguing for a strategic interaction model of
judging that focuses on coalition-building and institutional dynamics affecting Supreme Court
decisionmaking).
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variable being the rate at which laws survive strict scrutiny review.
Table 5 reports the results.
Table 5. Logistic Regression: Four Models of Strict Scrutiny Survival
in the Federal Courts, 1990-2003
H

III

IV

1.495***
(0.300)
0.630
(0.415)
-0.267
(0.404)
0.236
(0.313)

1.644***
(0.317)
0.536
(0.430)
0.031
(0.407)
0.162
(0.326)

1.354***
(0.413)
0.627
(0.438)
-0.013
(0.433)
0.015
(0.350)

0.926***
(0.268)
-0.754**
(0.293)

0.934***
(0.276)
-0.777**
(0.303)

Right
Religious Liberty
Freedom of Association
Fundamental Rights
Suspect Class Discrimination

1.621***
(0.288)
0.568
(0.403)
0.104
(0.382)
0.270
(0.293)

Enacting Institution
Federal Government
Local Government

1.563***
(0.427)
1.323***
(0.435)
0.515
(0.504)
1.418*
(0.615)

Judiciary
Congress
Federal Agency
Penal Institution
Other

-1.261***
(0.162)
34.488

-1.265***
(0.198)
65.884

0.959***
(0.240)
0.312
(0.709)
-0.076*
(0.031)
-1.222***
(0.323)
90.261

.103

.190

.253

Circuit Court
Supreme Court
Trend
Constant
Chi-Square
Nagelkerke R2

1.050***
(0.250)
0.522
(0.744)
-0.064*
(0.032)
-1.463***
(0.347)
107.157
.296

*p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Dependent variable = strict scrutiny survival rate. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 459.
Constant: Model I: Free speech laws; Model II: Free speech laws and laws adopted by state
governments; Model III: Free speech laws, laws adopted by state governments, district court
decisions, and year 1990; Model IV: Free speech laws, state legislation/constitutional provisions,
district court decisions, and year 1990.
Note: Model IV included variables for state agencies, educational institutions, local government,
and other governmental actors. These coefficients were not significant and were omitted from the
table for clarity.
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1. Model I
Model I is a simple logistic regression of strict scrutiny survival
by the underlying area of law that the case emerges in-that is, the
right alleged to be infringed. The coefficients indicate the deviation in
the strict scrutiny survival rate from the constant, which in this model
represents the survival rate in freedom of speech cases. So, the fact
that a case is a religious liberty controversy-which has a positive,
highly significant coefficient (1.354; p < .000)-is a significant
predictor of strict scrutiny survival compared to a free speech case.
None of the other rights (fundamental rights, freedom of
association, and suspect class discrimination), by contrast, deviate
significantly from freedom of speech cases. Thus, the fact that a law
discriminates on the basis of race does not make it significantly more
or less likely to survive strict scrutiny review.
This initial model confirms what the earlier difference in
means statistic indicated about strict scrutiny's being equally strict
across rights with the lone exception of religious liberty.

2. Model II
Model II estimates coefficients for the likelihood of surviving
strict scrutiny, controlling for both the identity of the underlying right
and federalism.
The constant here represents free speech strict
scrutiny decisions and decisions applying strict scrutiny to laws
adopted by state governments.
Like Model I, Model II indicates that religious liberty is the
only right in which strict scrutiny survival deviates significantly from
free speech strict scrutiny. Indeed, this same finding holds in each of
the models estimated in this section.
Model II offers a compelling indication of the importance of
federalism to strict scrutiny analysis. The fact that a law was adopted
by a federal governmental actor, as compared to a state governmental
actor, is a significant predictor of strict scrutiny success (0.926, p <
.000). That a law was enacted by a local governmental actor is also a
significant predictor, but of strict scrutiny failure as compared to a
state governmental actor (-0.754, p = .010). The data show a clear
linear relationship between survival and the federal hierarchy of
government. The further down the line from federal to state to local,
the less likely a law is to overcome judicial review under strict
scrutiny. This holds even if one controls, as Model II does, for the
underlying substantive right involved.
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The rise in both the Chi-square (from 34.488 to 65.884) and the
Nagelkerke R 2 (from .103 to .190) indicates that Model II better fits
the underlying patterns in the observed data. The addition of the
federalism variable provides more traction in understanding the
determinants of strict scrutiny survival than looking at the identity of
the right alone.
3. Model III
Model III adds variables for level of court (Supreme, circuit,
district) and trend (or timing) variables. The constant-the deviation
from which is shown by the reported coefficients-represents free
speech laws, state government laws, district court decisions, and
decisions from the year 1990. All of the variables indicated earlier to
be significant remain significant when we control for level of court and
trend.
This model indicates that, in addition to federalism and
religious liberty, the fact that a strict scrutiny application occurs in
circuit court, as compared to district court, is a highly significant,
positive predictor of strict scrutiny survival (0.959, p < .000). The
circuit courts are far more likely to uphold a law under strict scrutiny
than the district courts. The same does not hold for the Supreme
Court, which does not depart significantly from district court practice.
(0.312, p =.660). Note, however, that the Supreme Court coefficient is
based on a very small number of observations (12) and the standard
error is very high (0.709). More observations would be necessary to
make any reliable inferences about strict scrutiny survival at the
Supreme Court.
Trend is also a significant predictor of a law's likelihood of
being upheld, with laws more likely to be invalidated in later years (0.076, p = .014). Even accounting for the underlying substantive
right, the court, and federalism, strict scrutiny has become harder to
survive.
Model III fits the data better than the earlier models, as
indicated by the increase in both the Chi-square (90.261) and the
Nagelkerke R 2 (.253).
4. Model IV
Model IV breaks down the data with different enacting
institution variables. The federalism variables employed in the other
models only considered whether a law was adopted by a federal, state,
or local governmental entity. That approach shows quite clearly the
vertical dimensions of strict scrutiny review-that is, how outcomes
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vary depending upon which level of government in the federal
hierarchy is behind the law. Model IV complicates the picture
somewhat by uncovering horizontal variation among coordinate
branches and entities operating at the same level of government.
0
Each of the enacting institutions discussed in Part IV.B.115
was included in Model IV, although the table only reports the results
for Congress, the federal judiciary, federal agencies, and penal
institutions. 151 For this model, state legislation and constitutional
provisions were incorporated into the constant. The variables for the
underlying right, the level of the deciding court, and trend all remain
significant. Once again, the fit of this model is better than each of the
earlier ones (Chi-square = 107.157, Nagelkerke R 2 = .296).
The federalism story of the earlier models is made somewhat
more opaque by Model IV. Congress is a strong positive predictor of
strict scrutiny success (1.323, p = .002), and federal legislation is far
more likely to be upheld than state legislation. When the institution
behind a challenged law is the judiciary itself-as with a court order
or a judicially approved consent decree, courts are even more likely to
uphold the law under strict scrutiny (1.563, p < .000). As noted
earlier, all but one of the judiciary cases were orders or decrees
entered by federal courts. So far, the results conform to the earlier
discovery of a vertical federalism effect.
Federal agencies, however, do not appear to receive especially
lenient treatment as compared to ordinary state legislation (0.515, p =
.307). Thus, the federalism effect is only partial, and the executive
branch does not appear to benefit from it. Although federal agencies
have a relatively high survival rate (45%), once controls are added for
the other variables, the variation washes out. A closer look at the
federal agency cases reveals why: there have been relatively few
federal agency regulations (24) judged under the strict scrutiny
standard in the courts between 1990 and 2003, and one-third of those
were religious liberty cases (where strict scrutiny is already unusually
lenient). The federal agency cases report a high survival rate, but this
may be due to other overlapping factors. Courts, at least when they

150. See supra notes 109-139, and accompanying text.
151. The omitted coefficients, none of which were statistically significant, are state agencies
(-0.921), local governments (-0.527), educational institutions (-0.527), and other governmental
actors (-0.838). Of these, only local government was even close to significant (p =.137). The local
government variable in Model IV is not equivalent to the local government variable used in the
earlier models-due to the vertical breakdown of governmental institutions, many of the local
governmental laws fell into other categories (notably educational institutions)-and thus the
results for this variable have been omitted from the table to avoid confusion.
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apply strict scrutiny, do not appear to defer to federal agencies quite
as much as they do to other branches of the federal government.
Model lVs vertical breakdown also shows that penal
institutions are a positive predictor of strict scrutiny survival (1.418, p
= .021). The influence, however, is mild compared to the effect of
Congress or the judiciary. Although penal institution policies survive
at the greatest rate of any governmental actor (74%), the vast majority
are religious liberty cases (24 of 26 applications).
But penal
institutions still appear to have a slight positive impact on the
likelihood of strict scrutiny survival even when the underlying right
and the other variables are accounted for.
Strict scrutiny thus operates differently on a number of
dimensions. Not all rights are treated the same, with religious liberty
strict scrutiny being far easier to overcome than strict scrutiny in
other areas of law. Not all governmental actors are treated the same,
either; Congress, the judiciary, and penal institutions receive
relatively easy review. The circuit courts are more forgiving of
governmental intrusions on rights than the district courts, which may
be a measure of the relative difficulty of cases that are appealed.
Time is also on the plaintiffs side, as courts are becoming increasingly
unwilling to uphold governmental infringements on core rights. These
are some of the "relevant differences ' 152 that impact strict scrutiny in
practice.
V. A DOCTRINE-BY-DOCTRINE EXAMINATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
The findings described so far all come from a macro-level
examination of the strict scrutiny case law. This Part looks at each
constitutional right and its individual cases with the objectives of (1)
identifying within discrete doctrines what types of laws survive or fail
strict scrutiny, and (2) detecting discernible patterns within those
cases that may help to explain how strict scrutiny operates, with
special attention to the variables shown to be correlated with survival
in the estimated models.
A. Suspect Class Discrimination
Between 1990 and 2003, the federal courts applied strict
scrutiny 85 times in final rulings to questions of suspect class
discrimination under the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. All but one observed application

152. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).

834

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:793

of strict scrutiny involved a racial classification of some sort. 153 (For
convenience, therefore, I will refer to the entire group of suspect class
discrimination cases as "race" cases.) The overwhelming majority of
applications (85%) addressed the constitutionality of affirmative
The remainder was comprised of race-conscious
action policies.
electoral districting plans (12%) and arguably invidious discrimination
(3.5%, of which one of the three applications was a survivor).
The overall strict scrutiny survival rate in these cases was 27
percent, with 23 of 85 applications upholding the challenged use of
race or other suspect criterion. In one sense, this number should not
be all that surprising. Equal protection is an area of law in which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly written that laws are capable of
overcoming strict scrutiny. This Section reviews that case law,
identifies the various sorts of suspect classifications that were subject
to strict scrutiny during the period of my study, and isolates the types
of classifications that were most likely to survive or fail review. This
Section also considers the role of federalism, the enacting institution,
and political ideology-each of which is associated with strict scrutiny
survival in suspect class discrimination cases.
1. The Supreme Court, Race, and Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court paved the way for non-fatal applications of
strict scrutiny in the context of equal protection in a series of
The first Supreme Court decision
Rehnquist Court decisions.
arguably upholding a remedial race-based affirmative action policy
under strict scrutiny was Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers'
InternationalAssociation v. EEOC ("Sheet Metal Workers"), decided in
1986.154 The underlying lawsuit determined that a labor union was
guilty of unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII. 155 The court
ordered the union to remedy its own past discrimination by admitting
specified numbers of African-Americans and Latinos, but the judicial
order was challenged as racially discriminatory. 156 The Supreme
Court upheld the remedial order, with only a partial majority opinion.
The controlling plurality of four Justices expressed uncertainty about
the applicable standard of review but then argued that "the relief
ordered in this case passes even the most rigorous test-it is narrowly
tailored to further the Government's compelling interest in remedying
153. The one non-race case was Wallace v. Calogero, 286 F. Supp. 2d 748, 763-64 (E.D. La.
2003) (invalidating a Louisiana law barring non-immigrant aliens from practicing law).
154. 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1986) (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 426.
156. Id. at 440.
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past discrimination."'15 7 Justice Lewis Powell Jr. did not join the
plurality, but in his separate concurrence, he agreed that the plan
survived strict scrutiny, 158 establishing a majority of Justices who
would vote to uphold under that standard. A year later, in United
States v. Paradise,the Court once again upheld a remedial affirmative
action policy with no majority opinion. 159 The lead plurality echoed
Sheet Metal Workers and contended that the policy in that case
60
satisfied even strict scrutiny.
Although the Court did not uphold race-based affirmative
action under strict scrutiny in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co.61
and Adarand Constructors v. Pena,162 those cases set the parameters
of strict scrutiny in race discrimination cases. In Croson, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion for the Court 163 confirmed the
reasoning of Sheet Metal Workers and repeated several times that
remedial uses of race may overcome strict scrutiny where they are
designed to counter the past discriminatory practices of governmental
entities. 64
Indeed, O'Connor suggested that remedying past
discrimination was the only government objective that was compelling
enough to satisfy strict scrutiny in the context of race
discrimination. 65 In Adarand Constructors, decided in 1995, the
Court, again per O'Connor, held that strict scrutiny applied to federal
affirmative action policies (as compared to the state policy at issue in
Croson). 66 At the same time, Justice O'Connor explicitly rejected
what the myth of strict scrutiny has long taught: "we wish to dispel
' 16 7
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."
Strict scrutiny can be overcome, she suggested, when race-based
initiatives respond to the "unhappy persistence of both the practice

157. Id. at 480.
158. Id. at 485 (Powell, J., concurring).
159. 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (plurality opinion).
160. Id. at 166-67.
161. 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (plurality opinion).
162. 515 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1995).
163. The opinion is partially a majority opinion and partially a plurality opinion. See Croson,
488 U.S. at 476.
164. Id. at 492, 493.
165. See id. at 493 ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless
they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of
Forward-LookingAffirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 64 (2004) ("In the Court's opinion,
Justice O'Connor did say that affirmative action had to be limited to compensation for
specifically identified past discrimination.").
166. 515 U.S. at 227.
167. Id. at 237.
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and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
168
groups in this country."'
Commentators' readings of Croson and Adarand Constructors
emphasized that, regardless of Justice O'Connor's announced "wish,"
affirmative action was destined to fail strict scrutiny. According to
some, these decisions adopted a "crippling standard of review [that
' 1 69
put] a stranglehold on the power of state and local governments[,]
making it "improbable that a statute containing a race-based
classification will remain valid." 170 Others wrote that the standard
171
would be "nearly impossible.., to meet."'
Yet, the lower courts have proven capable of using strict
scrutiny to judge affirmative action plans in a more forgiving manner
than predicted.
Stuart v. Roache172 exemplifies the facts and
reasoning underlying many of the survivors in this area of law. In
Stuart, the First Circuit upheld under strict scrutiny a race-conscious
promotion program adopted by the Boston Police Department as part
of a consent decree that settled a discrimination lawsuit brought by
black officers. 7 3 The court held that the police department's prior
invidious discrimination-detailed in the consent decree-established
a compelling governmental interest in remediation, 174 and that the
race-conscious promotions were narrowly tailored means that gave
only limited consideration to race. l7 5 In other words, the Boston Police
Department's policy fit comfortably within Croson's framework.
Rather than sounding a death knell for affirmative action, Croson was
followed by federal courts upholding affirmative action plans under
strict scrutiny in, among others, the Chicago Police Department, 176 the
168. Id.
169. K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict Scrutiny, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 397, 400 (1997).
170. Erica J. Rinas, A Constitutional Analysis of Race-Based Limitations on Open
Enrollment in Public Schools, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1501, 1515 (1997).
171. William L. Taylor & Susan M. Liss, Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Staying the Course,
523 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 30, 35 (1992).
172. 951 F.2d 446 (lst Cir. 1991).
173. Id. at 455; see also Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 164 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding
under strict scrutiny the promotion to sergeant of black applicants with lower exam scores than
white applicants who were not promoted); Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of
Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding racial preferences for promotions to lieutenant
in the Boston police department, which had engaged in past discrimination, under strict
scrutiny).
174. Stuart, 951 F.2d at 452.
175. Id. at 454-55.
176. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding race-based
affirmative action plan to promote minority police officers); Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d
524, 521-30 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding under strict scrutiny the Chicago Police Department's
affirmative action plan that permitted the promotion of Hispanics over whites with higher test
scores); Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding an affirmative
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Chicago Fire Department, 177 the San Francisco Police Department, 178
Florida's Metropolitan Dade County Fire Department, 179 Alabama's
Montgomery County Sheriff Department, 8 0 the New York City Police
Department, 18 1 and the Cincinnati Police Department. 82 A similar
plan required the City of Yonkers, New York, to take affirmative steps
to integrate its public and subsidized housing. 18 3 None of this is to say
that Croson and the other Supreme Court cases did not circumscribe
race-based affirmative action, perhaps even a great deal.
Nevertheless, those decisions still left open an avenue for lower courts
to uphold some race-based affirmative action plans. Moreover, strict
scrutiny has proven no more strict in the area of race discrimination
than it is elsewhere, save for religious liberty.
2. Types of Race-Conscious Policies
There are five different types of race-conscious laws captured
by the data set: (1) race-based affirmative action plans adopted in the
context of public contracting, such as minority business, employment,
and housing preferences; 184 (2) policies to integrate historically

action plan for promotion of detectives in the Police Department under which applicants were
ranked within their respective racial categories and which set target goals on the basis of
estimated numbers of past minority promotions lost to discrimination).
177. See McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the
promotion of minority firemen to captain because there was evidence of past discrimination and
the minority proportion of captains remained lower than the percentage of minorities in the city's
population).
178. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 979 F.2d 721, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1992)
(applying strict scrutiny and upholding "banding" of test scores, according to which the San
Francisco Police Department treats scores within a statistically determined range as equivalent
in order to promote more minorities).
179. See Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding a
remedial affirmative action plan for Hispanics in the county fire department).
180. See Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1487-88 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(upholding under strict scrutiny a settlement agreement reached in a discrimination suit that
required county sheriff department to promote an equal number of black and white sergeants
and lieutenants for one year).
181. See Paganucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 476-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(upholding consent decree requiring remedial racial preferences for municipal police department
promotions).
182. See Vogel v. Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding the race-based
affirmative action policy of the Cincinnati Police Department).
183. See United States v. Sec'y of HUD, 239 F.3d 211, 218-221 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding a
court order requiring Yonkers to integrate its housing with race-based policies to remedy past,
intentional racial segregation).
184. See, e.g., Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dept. of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969-73 (8th Cir.
2003) (upholding public contracting rules); Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702,
714-15 (6th Cir. 1997) (invalidating public contracting rules); Associated Gen. Contractors of
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segregated law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, fire
departments, and correctional institutions;1 8 5 (3) diversity-enhancing
affirmative action plans in educational institutions;18 6 (4) race-based
legislative districting;18 7 and (5) miscellaneous other types of raceconscious policies and preferences (including small numbers of
broadcasting license preferences,1 8 8 judicial diversity programs,1 8 9 and
three arguably invidious classifications 19 0 ).
The Supreme Court has held that "all racial classifications
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly
scrutinized." 19 1 But do all different types of racial classifications fare
equally under strict scrutiny review, or do courts tend to uphold some
types of racial classifications and reject others? Table 6 reports the
strict scrutiny survival rate by type of race-conscious policy.

Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741, 771 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (invalidating public contracting
rules).
185. See supra notes 174-183, and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating racial
preferences in educational institution); Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.
2d 358, 382 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (invalidating racial preferences in educational institution); Shuford
v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 846 F. Supp. 1511, 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (upholding racial preferences
in educational institution).
187. See, e.g., Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding race-based
districting).
188. See, e.g., MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(invalidating broadcasting licensing racial preferences).
189. See, e.g., Back v. Bayh, 933 F. Supp. 738, 756-57 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (invalidating racial
preferences used by state judicial nominating commission).
190. See, e.g., Wallace v. Calogero, 286 F. Supp. 2d 748, 763-64 (E.D. La. 2003) (invalidating
a Louisiana law barring non-immigrant aliens from practicing law).
191. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
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Table 6. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Type of Racial Classification
Type of Racial Classification
Survival Rate Applications (N)
92

48%

25

Education

27%

11

Districting

20%

10

Public Contracting 193

13%

30

Other

22%

9

Total

27%

85

Law Enforcement Affirmative Action

F= 2.303, DF= 4, p = .065
Different types of racial classifications do survive at somewhat
different rates and the variation is very close to statistical significance
(p = .065).19 There are certainly some discernible patterns in the case
law. The use of race by law enforcement agencies, such as the
remedial affirmative action policies discussed above, 195 survive nearly
half the time (48%) with an ample number of observations (25). These
laws are the racial classifications most likely to be upheld by the
federal courts. Racial preferences used by educational institutions
survive 27 percent of the time, exemplified most prominently by
Grutter v. Bollinger. Race-based electoral districting policies are
upheld in 20 percent of observed applications, and racial
classifications falling within the default category survive in 22 percent
of applications. Public contracting laws, which are the most common
type of racial classification observed, fare the worst under strict
scrutiny. Such laws survive only 13 percent of the time-results
suggesting that strict scrutiny is nearly deadly enough to be
considered fatal in fact.
One potential explanation for this pattern is that courts may be
relatively inclined to uphold remedial affirmative action when the
challenged plan redresses the identified discrimination of a particular
government agency. In the law enforcement cases, for example, the

192. Law Enforcement includes fire department and police department hiring and promotion
plans, along with a few racial classifications used by penal institutions.
193. Public Contracting includes minority business set-asides, public employment
preferences (excluding law enforcement personnel and preference programs for Native
Americans), and race-conscious public housing policies.
194. The standard threshold for statistical significance is p < .005. However, in light of the
low F, even a p value of .065 is arguably significant.
195. See supra notes 172-183, and accompanying text.
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racial preferences usually remedy identified past discrimination by
the very same institution now adopting the policy, such as a police or
fire department. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that in such
instances, strict scrutiny is capable of being overcome. 196 Moreover,
many of the law enforcement cases involved consent decrees issued by
federal judges to settle race discrimination litigation. Courts may
believe, as Judge Richard Posner has written, "law-enforcement and
correctional settings [are] the very clearest examples of cases in which
departures from racial neutrality are possible. ' 197 The effectiveness of
law enforcement may depend upon adopting a measure of racial and
ethnic representation to foster public respect and confidence in the
police force and related agencies. One might therefore expect judges
to be relatively more willing to uphold remedial affirmative action
policies than racial classifications adopted by a legislature or
administrative agency (as in public contracting) or justified by other
governmental ends such as diversity (as in educational institutions).
One surprise from the data is that 20 percent of racial
redistricting cases survive review.
Under Shaw v. Reno and
subsequent Supreme Court districting decisions, strict scrutiny only
applies to districting when government officials draw election district
boundaries based predominantly on race. 198
This contrasts with
traditional equal protection doctrine, which subjects any intentional
use of race to strict scrutiny. 199 Due to the predominance requirement,
many (if not most) instances of race-influenced gerrymandering do not
receive strict scrutiny; courts inclined to uphold a plan can determine
that race played some role but did not predominate over other
traditional districting principles (such as compactness, contiguity, or
partisanship). 20 0
In light of this initial hurdle of predominance,
scholars speculated that strict scrutiny in districting cases would
become "a rule of automatic invalidation" 20 1 whenever race was found

196. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989).
197. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original).
198. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993); see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995);
see also Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1584 (2002).
199. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Karlan,
supra note 198, at 1584.
200. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (holding that a raceinfluenced districting plan was not predominantly motivated by race and thus strict scrutiny was
inapplicable).
201. Rubin, supra note 2, at 89. Rubin posits another interpretation of Shaw, but even this
second possibility, in his view, would lead to "invalidation of all race-conscious districts." Id.
(emphasis in original).
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to be the predominant factor behind a gerrymander.
scrutiny has not proven to be fatal in fact in these cases.

841
Yet strict

3. Federalism & Race
A recurrent theme in the affirmative action debate over the
past thirty years has been whether the courts should accord more
deference to the federal government's efforts to remedy the legacy of
racial discrimination than to corresponding efforts by the states. The
basis for this differentiation was the explicit power ceded to Congress
in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which set forth that "[t]he
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article."20 2
While granting Congress the
authority to enact legislation to fulfill the promise of equal protection,
the Fourteenth Amendment conversely limited the ability of states to
legislate in the area of race.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Supreme Court flirted with
the idea of implementing this greater level of deference to Congress by
applying intermediate scrutiny to race-conscious laws adopted by the
federal government, 20 3 while applying strict scrutiny to state laws. In
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, however, a majority of Justices held
that strict scrutiny applied to the federal government's race
classifications too. 20 4 The Court explained that the Constitution
demanded "congruence between the standards applicable to federal
and state racial classifications." 20 5 "Accordingly, we hold today that
all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
20 6
strict scrutiny."
Although the courts have achieved a formal congruence by
explicitly applying the same formal standard of "strict scrutiny" to all
racial classifications, federalism continues to have a strong association
with strict scrutiny survival. Table 7 reports the strict scrutiny
survival rate in suspect class discrimination cases broken down by
federal laws, on the one hand, and state and local laws on the other.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
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Table 7. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Level of Government in
Suspect Class Discrimination Cases
Level of Government

Survival Rate

Applications (N)

Federal 207

52%

25

State & Local 208

17%

60

Total

27%

85

F= 12.548, DF= 1, p = .001
There is a considerable difference in the survival rates of strict
scrutiny as applied to the federal government's uses of race, which are
upheld over half the time (52%), and state and local laws employing
race (17%). The variation is highly significant (p = .001). Indeed,
race-conscious laws adopted by the federal government are three
times more likely to survive than those adopted by the state and local
governments.
That federalism has such an apparently strong association
with strict scrutiny survival in race cases is consistent with the larger
pattern in the strict scrutiny case law. What is unusual here is that in
race cases the Supreme Court has so vigorously insisted upon
"congruence" and "consistency" in judicial treatment of federal and
state uses of race. In spite of the Court, judges in the lower courts
may be allowing their decisionmaking to be influenced by a relative
mistrust of state and local governments as compared to the federal
government.
Deference to the federal government may now be
implemented through relatively deferential application of strict
scrutiny rather than through an explicitly more lenient standard of
review.
4. Political Ideology and Race-Conscious Policies
In the aggregated strict scrutiny data, the political ideology of
the judge-as determined by the imperfect proxy of the party of the
nominating president-had no statistically significant impact on
whether a judge voted to uphold or invalidate a law. But few issues
have been as politically divisive in recent years as race-based
affirmative action, raising the specter that ideology may have a role to
207. Federal Actors includes Congress, federal administrative agencies, and federal judicial
orders.
208. State & Local includes all other enacting institutions.
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play in this specific context even if ideology washes out in the larger
data set. Moreover, the contending sides in the debate over whether
affirmative action is an appropriate tool to redress centuries of racial
segregation closely parallel the primary ideological dividing line in
American politics. The Democratic Party is typically viewed to be proaffirmative action, and the Republican Party is commonly understood
to oppose it. Democrat judges might well be expected to vote to uphold
racial preferences with greater frequency than Republican judges.
Table 8 reports judicial votes in race cases by the political
ideology of the casting judge. For this test, the relevant data are
judicial votes rather than applications; each vote on a panel of judges
is counted as a single observation.
Table 8. Strict Scrutiny Survival and Political Ideology in Race Cases
Survival Rate

Votes (N)

Democrat

48%

69

Republican

26%

138

Total

33%

207

Party of Appointing President

F= 10.169, DF= 1, p = .002
Political ideology does appear to be associated with the
20 9
likelihood of a judge's vote to uphold or reject racial classifications.
Judges appointed by Democratic presidents vote to uphold racial
classifications about half the time under strict scrutiny (48%), while
judges appointed by Republicans vote to uphold only about one in four
(26%). Republican-appointed judges vote on racial classifications at a
rate consistent with strict scrutiny more generally, but Democraticappointed judges treat racial classifications much more deferentially
than the average law subjected to strict scrutiny. In fact, Democratic
appointees are almost twice as likely to vote to uphold a racial
classification as Republican appointees. Moreover, this difference is
highly significant (p = .002). When it comes to racial classifications,
political ideology is closely tied to judicial voting behavior.

209. The pattern is similar to that found by Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 149, at
319, in their study of federal appellate court decisions on affirmative action between 1978 and
2002.
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B. Free Speech
Free speech law is the area of law in which the most strict
scrutiny cases arise (222 of 459), comprising 48 percent of all strict
scrutiny applications in the federal courts during the covered
period. 2 10 Where government regulates protected speech on the basis
of the substance of what is expressed, such regulation is considered
content-based and is usually subject to strict scrutiny. 211 Although
Gunther's famous adage arose in the context of equal protection, strict
scrutiny is actually most fatal in the area of free speech, where the
survival rate is 22 percent, lower than in any other right.
The free speech cases can be broken down by the type of law
adjudicated. Within the large body of speech restrictions subjected to
strict scrutiny, there are a number of identifiable clusters of similar
laws-the differences between which are associated with variation in
the rate of survival. As with racial classifications, some types of
speech laws are more likely than others to overcome strict scrutiny.
Also like the race cases, in free speech cases federalism is strongly
associated with the likelihood of survival, although that variable is not
one traditionally associated with judicial review in the speech area. 212
1. Types of Speech Restrictions & Sub-Doctrinal Variation in Speech
Cases
There is considerable variation in the types of laws found
within the body of speech cases considered by the federal courts under
the strict scrutiny standard. One can break down the laws into seven
categories: (1) campaign speech regulations, including campaign
finance laws and electioneering restrictions; (2) limits on the right of
access to court proceedings and records; (3) indecency laws; (4)
viewpoint discriminatory rules on access to public forums; (5) sign
ordinances; (6) charity solicitation laws; and (7) miscellaneous other
210. Included in this category are 8 observed applications of strict scrutiny to speech
restrictions arising under the fundamental rights strand of the Equal Protection Clause. These
cases apply the doctrine of the First Amendment, even though they are formally brought under
the Fourteenth Amendment (and not just for reasons of incorporation).
211. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (explaining that strict scrutiny
applies to content-based speech restrictions).
212. This area of constitutional law showed no statistically significant difference in survival
votes between Democrat and Republican appointed judges. Democratic appointees are slightly
less likely than Republican appointees to uphold a speech restriction (22% to 27%, with N = 164
and 318 respectively), but this difference was not statistically significant (p = .224). This finding
even held in the campaign finance area. Democrat appointees voted to uphold 29% of the time in
campaign finance controversies (N = 48), compared to 30% by Republican appointees (N = 128),
with no statistical significance (p = .947).
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speech restrictions. Table 9 reports the survival rate for each of these
types of speech restrictions.
Table 9. Strict Scrutiny Survival Rates by Type of Speech Law
Survival Rate Applications (N)
Type of Speech Law
Right of Access to Courts

50%

26

Charity Solicitation

50%

12

Indecency

33%

15

Campaign Speech

24%

82

Public Forum Viewpoint Discrimination

4%

28

Sign Ordinances

0%

18

Other

10%

41

Total

22%

222

F= 6.230, DF = 6, p < .000
Each of these subgroups deserves some individualized
attention. Notice, however, the range of variation in survival rates:
from 0 percent in sign ordinance cases and 4 percent in public forum
cases, to 50 percent in charity solicitation cases and access-to-court
cases. Clearly, not all types of speech laws are equally likely to be
invalidated under strict scrutiny-and some types are as likely to pass
strict scrutiny as fail. The variation is highly significant (p < .000).
a. Campaign Speech Restrictions
The largest group involves campaign speech regulation, which
includes campaign finance laws, judicial campaign speech codes, and
other laws regulating the speech of candidates for office or their
supporters. There were 82 strict scrutiny applications arising from
campaign speech restrictions in the covered period, of which 20 were
survivors, for a survival rate of 24 percent.
The Supreme Court first suggested the survivability of
campaign speech restrictions in the landmark campaign finance
decision, Buckley v. Valeo. 213 In Buckley, the Court applied what it
termed the "closest scrutiny" 214 to judge provisions of the Federal

213. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
214. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
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Election Campaign Act limiting expenditures by candidates and
contributions to candidates. The Court wrote that "it can hardly be
doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office" 215 and that the laws in question intentionally "suppress[]
communication"2 16 by "impos[ing] direct quantity restrictions on
political communication." 217 As a result, the Court rejected the
traditionally more deferential tests used for content-neutral laws and
insisted that the expenditure and contribution limits be judged
instead under a "rigorous standard of review." 218 Applying this
standard, the Court invalidated the expenditure limits 219 but upheld
the contribution limits, which were justified by the compelling
government interests in combating quid pro quo corruption between
candidates and contributors and in preventing the appearance of such
corruption.220
Although the Supreme Court eventually scrapped strict
scrutiny in the context of contribution limits, 22 1 the Court continues to
insist that strict scrutiny applies to other types of campaign finance
laws. Thus, in FederalElection Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee ("NRWC'), the Court upheld federal restrictions on who
could be solicited to contribute to corporate political action committees
under what the Court termed to be "the closest scrutiny." 222 In Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,223 the Supreme Court held that
states have a "compelling" reason to bar corporations from using
general treasury funds to support candidates, namely preventing the
"use [of] resources amassed in the economic marketplace to obtain an
215. Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
216. Id. at 17.
217. Id. at 18.
218. Id. at 29.
219. Id. at 45-48.
220. Id. at 24-28.
221. In Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, the Court officially revised the test for contribution
limits and held that something less than strict scrutiny applied to these specific types of
campaign finance regulations: a form of intermediate scrutiny that required "close" tailoring to
further a sufficiently "important" end. 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000). Measured by the language
of the lower court opinions in contribution ban cases, it appears that judges thought they were
applying strict scrutiny in the pre-Nixon years--or, at least, that is what they said in justifying
their decisions. According to Christina Wells, prior to Nixon the courts "consistently...
interpreted Buckley as requiring strict scrutiny review for contribution limitations." Wells,
supra note 80, at 150 n.67. For purposes of my study, I have labeled decisions in contribution
limits cases occurring between 1990 and 2000 (the year Nixon was handed down) as strict
scrutiny cases, unless the court referred to the applicable standard as something other than
strict scrutiny.
222. 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) [hereinafter NRWC] (citation omitted).
223. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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unfair advantage in the political marketplace." 224 The Court explicitly
stated that the applicable standard was strict scrutiny. 225 More
recently, in McConnell v. F.E.C., the Court extended the Austin
rationale to apply to labor unions and upheld under strict scrutiny
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that barred
funds to pay for
corporations and unions from using general treasury
226
Day.
Election
to
close
electioneering advertisements
Since 1990, the lower federal courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead and upheld a wide variety of campaign speech laws under
strict scrutiny. As in Buckley, NRWC, Austin, and McConnell, the
lower courts often find that electoral speech restrictions are justified
by government's need to preserve the integrity of the electoral process
from various types of corrupting influences. Indeed, the Court's
frequent rulings in this area and occasional insistence that the only
compelling governmental end is protecting the integrity of the
electoral process by combating corruption or its appearance has had
the effect of coordinating arguments about the first prong of strict
scrutiny analysis. In the majority of campaign speech case (72%), the
government argues that the speech restriction is necessitated by the
compelling governmental ends of combating corruption and preserving
the integrity of the electoral process. As a result, the meat of strict
scrutiny in this area of law is on the narrow tailoring prong. Laws
survive or fail primarily based on the court's determination whether
227
there are less restrictive alternatives to achieving those ends.
Which campaign speech laws are most likely to survive strict
scrutiny and which most likely to be invalidated? Courts uphold
disclosure requirements at a relatively high rate (41%)228 and show an
inclination to uphold restrictions on corporate expenditures (50%,
although there were very few cases) 229 and laws burdening speech in
Alternately, courts
the context of judicial elections (28%).230

224. Id. at 659 (citation omitted).
225. See id. at 657 ("[W]e must ascertain whether it burdens the exercise of political speech
and, if it does, whether it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
226. 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003). McConnell did not explicitly refer to "strict scrutiny" but relied
directly on Austin, which did unambiguously use strict scrutiny, and required that the
electioneering finance restrictions be justified by a "compelling governmental interest." See id.
As a result, I have coded McConnell's adjudication of the electioneering finance restrictions as an
application of strict scrutiny.
227. Of the 62 campaign speech fatalities, 57 contain a sufficient analysis of strict scrutiny to
determine what prong of the test was found to be unsatisfied. Of those 57, 47 (or 82%) ruled that
the ends were compelling and the constitutionality of the law turned on the fit.
228. N = 17.
229. N = 4.
230. N = 7.
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consistently invalidate petition circulator restrictions (6% survival
rate) 23 1 and expenditure limits (0%).232
One particularly surprising finding arises from the courts'
treatment of contribution limits. For many years after Buckley,
commentators suggested that the Supreme Court did not really apply
strict scrutiny to contribution limits. 233 In part, this sentiment was
due to the ambiguity of the Buckley opinion, which was hastily written
and less than crystal clear about its standards of review. But the
sentiment was also likely a product of the Gunther myth itself: how
could a law survive strict scrutiny if the test was fatal in fact?
Moreover, the Buckley Court seemed to accept a relatively loose fit
between the particular contribution limits chosen by Congress and the
governmental end of combating corruption.
Presumably, some
candidates could be "bought" for less than $1,000-the ceiling imposed
by the federal law-and some could not be "bought" for much greater
sums. According to Buckley, "Congress' failure to engage in such fine
tuning does not invalidate the legislation .... [A] court has no scalpel
to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as
$1,000. Such distinctions in degree become significant only when they
can be said to amount to differences in kind."234 Ordinarily strict
scrutiny would be expected to invalidate the use of means that further
their underlying ends with such imprecision.
The notion that
Buckley's approach to contribution limits was not "real" strict scrutiny
was only magnified by the Court's decision in 2000 to formally adopt
an intermediate level of scrutiny for contribution limits. 23 5
Based on the common view that contribution limits were not
really judged under strict scrutiny-even though the lower courts
consistently wrote that they were applying strict scrutiny before
2000 236-one might suppose that the standard applied to contribution
limits was easier to satisfy than strict scrutiny more generally. To
test this hypothesis, one can compare the survival rate of strict
scrutiny in contribution limits cases to the 30 percent survival rate for
the aggregate strict scrutiny data set (or, alternatively, to the 24
231. N = 16.
232. N=4.
233. See, e.g., Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations and
the UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine, 10 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q. 601, 607 (1983) (recognizing
the lack of clarity in Buckley and observing that "the Court seemed to scrutinize some of the
limitations more closely than others, giving credence to the interpretation that the level of
scrutiny was subject to a sliding scale").
234. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (citation omitted).
235. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (requiring that
contribution limits have "close" tailoring to further a sufficiently "important" end).
236. See Wells, supra note 80, at 150 n.67.
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percent survival rate in areas other than religious liberty). There
were 18 applications of strict scrutiny to contribution limits in final
rulings between 1990 and 2000, yet only 4 of those applications upheld
the challenged law. This amounts to a survival rate of 22 percentwell below the aggregate survival rate and slightly lower than the
strict scrutiny rate in areas of law other than religious liberty. Strict
scrutiny, as the lower courts applied it, appears to have been no less
rigorous in contribution limits cases than in strict scrutiny cases
generally.
b. Right of Access to JudicialProceedings
A second distinguishable subset of strict scrutiny free speech
decisions addresses the First Amendment right of access to judicial
proceedings and records. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held
that this right is governed by strict scrutiny. Yet in Press-Enterprise
v. Superior Court of California,the Court held that judges may order
the closure of courts-usually from the media-if "that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." 237 A valid argument can be made that these cases
ought to be treated as their own separate First Amendment doctrine
rather than as true free speech cases. Laws and court orders sealing
judicial records do not technically limit speech or communication.
They limit access to records prepared for judicial purposes, but the
media can publish this same information if obtained some other way.
Nevertheless, the courts consistently claim to be applying freedom of
speech principles, and lower courts have read Press-Enterpriseto hold
238
that "strict scrutiny is the correct standard."
Encouraged perhaps by Press-Enterprise,however, the federal
courts apply an relatively lenient form of strict scrutiny to laws
burdening the right of access to court proceedings and records. Fifty
percent of strict scrutiny applications in right-of-access cases uphold
the challenged laws (13 of 26). Breaking down the right-of-access
decisions, one finds that courts tend to uphold restrictions on media
access to grand jury or other traditionally closed proceedings
(100%);239 access limitations designed to protect minors (100%);240 and

237. 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
238. Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994). I thank Eugene
Volokh for reminding me that such cases do not technically limit speech. If all of the right-ofaccess decisions are removed from the free speech category, the survival rate of speech laws
declines to 18 percent-still far from inevitably fatal.
239. N =4.
240. N =4.
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restrictions adopted in terrorism cases (67%).241 By contrast, courts
seem relatively hostile to denials of access to ordinary criminal
proceedings and records (16%).242 In the two cases dealing with courtimposed restrictions on the ability of attorneys to communicate posttrial with jurors, the courts ruled against the court orders.
Courts may be sympathetic to right-of-access restrictions
because the governmental action underlying the claim is either an
order by another federal court trying to control its proceedings or a
law with the same objective.
In strict scrutiny decisions more
generally, courts tend to uphold orders of other federal courts that
happen to infringe on rights. Moreover, one might expect that courts
would be relatively open-minded about the need to limit on access to
court records and proceedings designed to protect the integrity of the
judicial process. No one is more invested in this ideal than other
federal judges, and one would expect them to understand the
importance of such efforts.
c.

Viewpoint Discriminationin Access to Public Forums

Between 1990 and 2003, there were 28 published final rulings
on the merits in the federal courts concerning the constitutionality of
viewpoint discrimination in granting access to public forums. The
typical viewpoint discriminatory public forum restriction bars a
political or religious group from using a school or library's public
rooms, 24 3 speaking at city council or other governmental meetings, 244
displaying art in government buildings or spaces, 245 or taking out
advertisements on buses or "adopt-a-highway" programs. 246 This is a
241. N = 3.
242. N = 16.

243. See, e.g., Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 1501, 1502 (8th Cir. 1994)
(invalidating denial of access to public school's facilities); Khademi v. S. Orange County Cmty.
Coll. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (invalidating law requiring advance
approval for postings at a community college); Pfeifer v. City of W. Allis, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1253,
1267-68 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (invalidating denial of access to public library's meeting room).
244. See, e.g., Zapach v. Dismuke, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682, 698 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (invalidating
denial of access to public comment period of a government meeting); Pesek v. City of Brunswick,
794 F. Supp. 768, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (invalidating city council's prohibition of a firefighter
speaking at council meetings).
245. See, e.g., Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2001) (invalidating
municipality's refusal to display controversial art in City Hall); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 612
(7th Cir. 1992) (invalidating ban on religious displays in public parks).
246. See, e.g., Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d
242, 244 (3d Cir. 1998) (invalidating refusal to allow anti-abortion advertisements in public
buses); Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Ark. State Highway and Transp. Dept., 807 F. Supp. 1427,
1438-39 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (invalidating exclusion of the Ku Klux Klan from adopt-a-highway
program).
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sub-group of free speech law where strict scrutiny has been truly fatal
in fact. Of the 28 applications of strict scrutiny, all but one 247 resulted
in the viewpoint discriminatory rule being invalidated, establishing a
survival rate of 4 percent.
In a substantial percentage of the public forum cases (39%), the
challenged laws or policies were adopted in a purported effort to
comply with the Constitution itself.
Laws denying religious
organizations access to public forums are usually defended on the
ground that the discriminatory treatment is itself required by the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Yet the courts reject the
"compellingness" of this end in every case, 248 generally explaining that
discrimination against religion is not required by the Clause. As a
249
result, the ends fail to satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny.
Moreover, this type of law is overwhelmingly adopted by local
governmental entities (79%). As with strict scrutiny more generally,
local governmental laws that restrict rights fare especially poorly. It
may be that federal courts are especially distrustful of local
governments and thus little heed to the constitutional interpretations
of local officials. Alternatively, local governmental officials may be
particularly willing to adopt laws that stray far from extant
constitutional standards. In either case, public forum restrictions are
not well received in the federal courts.
d. Sign Ordinances
Signs posted in yards or along public roads have become a
common sight in suburban America, and local governments have
attempted to limit this type of speech through permit requirements,
temporal limits on yard signs, prohibitions on placing signs that
mention anything other than that property's particular use, and
illumination restrictions. Most of these laws imposed special burdens
on political signs and thus might have been included in the campaign
speech category. Yet, the sign ordinance cases are not justified by
election-related goals such as preserving the integrity of the electoral
process. Rather, the ends behind sign ordinance laws tend to be
247. See Mood For A Day, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 953 F. Supp. 1252, 1271-72 (D. Utah
1995) (upholding a county's refusal to allow a pro-marijuana group alleged to be advocating
violation of the criminal laws to operate a booth at a family-themed county fair).
248. N = 10.

249. See, e.g., Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1281 (10th Cir.
1996) (rejecting end of compliance with the Establishment Clause in the context of a city policy
banning religious instruction and worship in city-owned senior centers); Good News/Good Sports
Club v. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 1501, 1502 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting compliance end asserted to justify
school district's denial of religious organization's access to district property).
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quality of life concerns such as maintaining a visually pleasing
aesthetic in neighborhoods and traffic control. 250 The sign ordinance
laws are also somewhat unique because they are treated to a very
severe scrutiny. Eighteen published final rulings on the merits of the
constitutionality of sign ordinances were handed down by the federal
courts between 1990 and 2003 under strict scrutiny, and not a single
court upheld such an ordinance. Here one sees the most fatal strict
scrutiny possible: no laws survive it.
These are relatively easy free speech cases under the strict
scrutiny standard. The quality of life interest is hardly a "compelling"
interest-one that government absolutely must promote-and the
courts consistently held that sign ordinances failed the first prong of
strict scrutiny. 251 Moreover, even to the extent there is a worthwhile
traffic safety component to the avoidance of visual clutter, the laws
are usually woefully under-inclusive. By targeting political signs in
particular, and failing to cover "for sale" signs and other commercial
signs, the laws do not further even the potentially valid ends with
252
sufficient precision.
e.

CharitableSolicitationRestrictions

If viewpoint discrimination in public forums and sign
ordinances receive hostile reception in the federal courts, charity
solicitation laws receive a relatively warm welcome. Of the 12
applications of strict scrutiny to restrictions on charitable
solicitations, half survived review. Among the types of restrictions
likely to survive were disclosure requirements imposed on solicitors
(75%)253

and restrictions on solicitation by law enforcement personnel

(66%).254 It is not surprising to find the former in the survivor camp
as the disclosure requirements tend to be straightforwardly designed
to prevent fraud and protect consumers. Courts consistently accept
the sincerity of this legislative motivation; all but one found the

250. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1403 (8th Cir. 1995) (regulating
placement of political signs for aesthetic and traffic safety reasons); King Enters., Inc. v. Thomas
Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 891, 896 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (regulating exterior signs for the purposes of
"public safety, aesthetics and economic development").
251. The ends prong was not satisfied in 14 of the 18 sign ordinance applications.
252. See, e.g., Whitton, 54 F.3d at 1410-11 (invalidating sign law targeting political speech
as underinclusive); Sugarman v. Village of Chester, 192 F. Supp. 2d 282, 302-03 (S.D. N.Y. 2002)
(invalidating sign law targeting political speech as underinclusive).
253. N=4.
254. N = 3.
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underlying governmental interests compelling. 255
The law
enforcement solicitation cases are much more surprising in light of the
fact that courts are upholding special restrictions on solicitation by
police officers raising money to benefit public servants and their
families.
Yet courts appear willing to recognize the highly
contextualized nature of police officers' speech, which in the instance
of solicitation may be perceived as coercive. 256 By contrast, courts
have invalidated curfews imposed on solicitors (2 applications, both
fatalities) 257 and a handful of various other types of restrictions.
f.

Indecency Regulation

Another cluster of free speech cases is comprised of challenges
to laws that regulate indecent speech-i.e., sexually explicit speech
short of obscenity (which is not formally protected by the First
Amendment 258 ). The interest asserted in nearly all of the indecency
cases is the obviously compelling governmental interest of protecting
minors from harms thought to stem from access to sexually explicit
materials. The Supreme Court has clearly held that "protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors" by "shielding [them]
from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards"
is compelling. 259 In light of the perceived importance of the underlying
goal, one might expect the courts to be relatively deferential to
legislative efforts in this area.
In fact, however, strict scrutiny in indecency cases is close to
the mean survival rate for all strict scrutiny applications. Of the 15
applications of strict scrutiny to indecency regulations, only 5 (33%)
survived review. The number of observations is relatively small, but
the evidence does suggest that courts are not especially forgiving of

255. For examples of courts upholding disclosure laws, see Special Programs, Inc. v. Courter,
923 F. Supp. 851, 860-61 (E.D. Va. 1996) (upholding disclosure requirement); Lucas v. Curran,
856 F. Supp. 260, 273 (D. Md. 1994) (upholding disclosure requirement); Am. Ass'n of State
Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (upholding disclosure
requirement).
256. See, e.g., Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 889 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding
ban on charity solicitations by law enforcement personnel); Tex. State Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Morales, 10 F. Supp. 2d 628 (N.D. Tx. 1998) (upholding ban on charity solicitations by law
enforcement personnel).
257. See, e.g., Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Mentor-On-The-Lake, 272 F. Supp. 2d 671, 67475 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (invalidating curfew); Tex. State Troopers Ass'n, Inc., 10 F. Supp. at 637
(invalidating curfew).
258. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
259. Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
756-57 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
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indecency legislation.
Courts were consistently intolerant of
indecency regulations imposed on Internet communications (0%),260
but willing to accept the legitimacy of dial-a-porn restrictions (66%)261
and television/radio broadcast limits (50%).262 In all but one indecency
case, the governmental end of protecting minors was accepted as
compelling. But courts usually held that less restrictive alternatives
were available that posed fewer hurdles for adults' constitutionally
263
protected access to indecent material.
g.

Other Speech Restrictions

The types of speech laws discussed so far do not exhaust the
field. Some types of free speech restrictions were subject to too few
strict scrutiny applications during the covered period to warrant
individualized treatment.
These include bans on making false
accusations against public officials 264 (0% survival rate) 265 and parade
permitting
and restrictions 266 (which survive
in 11%
of
267
applications).
There is also a host of odd cases that would provide
several years worth of fun and interesting Constitutional Law exam
questions: a law that prohibits midwives from advising mothers in
labor; 269 bans on fortunetelling and astrology; 270 a refusal to allow a

260. N = 5.

261. N=3.
262. N = 4.
263. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (state law
criminalizing computer dissemination of material harmful to minors held to be overinclusive);
Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1990) (alternatives
available to state restrictions on access to sexually explicit phone service).
264. See, e.g., Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Nev. 2002) (holding statute
that criminalized the filing of false allegations of misconduct against a police officer violated the
First Amendment); Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1248 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (holding state law making it a misdemeanor to knowingly file a false misconduct allegation
against a police officer violates the First Amendment).
265. N = 4.

266. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1996) (invalidating restriction of
abortion protestors to specific areas around abortion clinics); Trewhella v. City of Lake Geneva,
249 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1076-77 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (invalidating selective permitting requirement
for parades and protests); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1459-60 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(invalidating the revocation of a permit to protest at the President's inauguration).
267. N=9.
269. Dickerson v. Stuart, 877 F. Supp. 1556, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (upholding the midwife
speech restriction).
270. Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668-69 (W.D. La. 1999) (invalidating
fortunetelling ban); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1041-42 (E.D. Wis. 1997)
(invalidating astrology and fortunetelling ban).
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state university's fraternity to host an "ugly woman" contest; 271 a law
banning the wearing of masks in public (to target the Ku Klux
Klan);272 restrictions on the rental of violent video games; 273 and a ban
on trading cards depicting heinous criminals. 274
All of these
miscellaneous cases are grouped together in the "Other" category.
This is nevertheless a substantial group of strict scrutiny decisions
and makes up the second largest group of free speech cases (behind
campaign speech restrictions). As a group, however, they fared poorly
in the courts during the covered period with a 10 percent (4 of 41)
survival rate.
2. Free Speech and Federalism
The earlier analysis of the data indicated that federalism had a
considerable impact on the likelihood of strict scrutiny survival in both
the aggregate body of applications and in suspect class discrimination
cases.
The same dynamic we identified earlier-courts' greater
tendency to uphold a federal law than a state or local measure-also
plays out in the free speech cases.
Table 10 reports the results of the survival rate of speech
restrictions by level of government.
Table 10. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Level of Government in
Free Speech Cases
Level of Government

Survival Rate

Applications (N)

Federal

59%

37

State

21%

114

Local

4%

70

Total

22%

222

F= 9.560, DF=6, p < .000

271. IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393
(4th Cir. 1993) (invalidating the contest ban).
272. Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 836 (N.D. Ind.
1999) (invalidating the anti-mask law).
273. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003)
(invalidating rental restrictions); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 687
(8th Cir. 1992) (same).
274. Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (invalidating the trading
card ban).
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The federalism effect is apparently very strong in free speech
cases (p < .000). When applying strict scrutiny to speech restrictions,
the federal courts are far more likely to uphold a federal law (59%)
than a state law (21%). Laws enacted at the local level-by city
councils, school districts, libraries, counties, and alike-are especially
unlikely to survive review. Strict scrutiny was fatal to all but 4
percent of local laws considered by the federal courts between 1990
and 2003. The linear descent in the survival rate from the federal
level to the local level is striking.
It is also quite surprising. In contrast to race discrimination,
free speech is an area of constitutional law in which there has not
been a vibrant debate about whether courts should scrutinize federal
laws differently than state or local laws. In fact, there is almost no
contemporary scholarship on how federalism concerns ought to shape
judicial review in the context of freedom of speech. 2 5 In the 1950s
and 60s, the second Justice John Harlan argued in a series of
concurring and dissenting opinions in obscenity cases that the
Constitution mandated distinct judicial treatment of federal compared
to state impairments on speech. 276 He argued, however, that "the
dangers of federal censorship in this field are far greater than
anything the states may do," and called for stricter limits on federal
speech laws. 27 7 Yet, looking at judicial practice in recent years,
federalism operates exactly the opposite of Harlan's proposal, at least
in free speech laws governed by strict scrutiny.

275. One notable counter-example is Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional
Law: A Critical Examination of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Speech Codes, and AntiPornography Ordinances, 21 J. L. & POL. 233, 244-47 (2005). Contrary to the pattern I
uncovered, Rosen argues for courts to give local governments more leeway than the states or the
federal government in regulating speech. Id.
276. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496-508 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part) (arguing for separate standard for federal impediments on obscenity); see also
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493-97 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same). Early in his
service, (then) Justice William Rehnquist, who occupied the seat on the Court vacated by Harlan,
continued the call for stricter review of federal speech laws. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for more stringent
standards for federal impairments on free speech). Of course, studies of Justice Harlan's judicial
philosophy have recognized Harlan's preference for favoring state over federal speech laws. See
Norman Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional Conservative, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 249, 262-63 (1969) ("In his view the broad responsibility of states for public welfare under
the police power grants them more leeway to regulate free expression."); Daniel A. Farber &
John Nowak, Justice Harlan and the First Amendment, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 425, 432 (1985)
("Harlan was willing to allow the states broad leeway in regulation of obscenity. In his view,
however, the legitimate sphere of federal regulation was narrowly circumscribed.").
277. Roth, 354 U.S. at 505.
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What remains uncertain is the explanation behind this
federalism effect.
Is it because courts defer to the federal
government's efforts to restrict speech?
Perhaps the federal
government is more likely than states to adopt types of speech laws
that, regardless of federalism, are capable of overcoming strict
scrutiny. There is some noticeable difference in the types of speech
laws adopted by the federal government as compared to state and
local governments. Federal actors tend to adopt laws restricting the
right of access to courts and indecency laws, which are relatively likely
to survive review. Local governments, by contrast, enact laws such as
sign ordinances and viewpoint discriminatory rules of access to public
forums, 2 7 9 which are almost always invalidated.
Yet federalism has the same effect across types of speech
restrictions, suggesting that federalism as such is playing a role.
While most of the right of access to court restrictions are federal in
origin (77%), state laws regulating such access are much less likely to
survive (17% for states compared to 60% for the federal
government 28 1 ). In campaign speech cases, where the survival rate
was only 24 percent, all of the federal campaign speech laws
adjudicated under strict scrutiny were upheld and only a minority of
state laws survived. In indecency cases, the courts upheld federal
laws 50 percent of the time 28 2 and state laws 25 percent, 28 3 while
invalidating all of the indecency measures adopted by local
governmental entities. Federalism clearly deserves more attention by
28 4
scholars as a factor in free speech law.
C. Religious Liberty
In the period covered by this study, there were 73 applications
of strict scrutiny in published final rulings pertaining to religious
liberty. As noted earlier, the religious liberty category had the highest
survival rate of any area of law in which strict scrutiny applies: 59

279. All 18 of the sign ordinance laws and 19 of 28 instances of public forum discrimination
were adopted by local governmental actors. There was only one instance of a federal law
restricting access to a public forum, and it was invalidated.
281. N = 6 and N = 20, respectively.
282. N = 8.

283. N=4.
284. For my own effort to explain the federalism effect in free speech cases, see Adam
Winkler, Free Speech Federalism (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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percent, more than double the mean of the other doctrinal categories.
What accounts for this unusually high survival rate and what types of
religious liberty cases survive strict scrutiny? This Section considers
several potentially influential variables. First, the cases will be
examined to determine if the high survival rate is tied to the fact that
most of the religious liberty cases apply statutory-rather than
constitutional-strict scrutiny. Second, this Section will determine if
the survival rate is tied to the substantive nature of the religious
285
liberty claims rather than the legal origin of the standard.
1. Statutory Versus Constitutional Strict Scrutiny
To begin, one can distinguish two groups of cases within the
religious liberty set: (1) constitutional applications arising from the
Free Exercise Clause, 286 and (2) statutory applications arising from
federal legislation, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") 287 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act ("RLUIPA"). 288 The religious liberty doctrine is the only one in the
data set that includes decisions that apply strict scrutiny due to a
statutory mandate. While the formal origin of this strict scrutiny is
unusual, the test remains strict scrutiny; the statutory language
requires that challenged laws be narrowly tailored means of
28 9
furthering compelling governmental interests.
A bit of background is in order. Strict scrutiny has had a
troubled history in the area of religious liberty. The Court first held
that strict scrutiny applied in constitutional free exercise cases in
1963's Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court declared unconstitutional
the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman fired for her
unwillingness to work on the Saturday Sabbath. 290 In the 1970s and
1980s, however, the courts granted very few religion-based exemptions
to generally applicable laws despite applying strict scrutiny in many
285. A statistical test using the ideology proxy found no significant difference between
Republican and Democratic appointees' votes to uphold/reject religious liberty infringements.
286. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (invalidating requirement that police officers shave their beards); United
States v. Hammer, 121 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (invalidating mandatory autopsy
policy).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D. Or. 1996) (upholding
provisions of the Bald & Golden Eagle Protection Act from RFRA challenge).
288. See, e.g., Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947, 952 (W.D. Wis. 2002)
(invalidating prison ban on inmate's use of prayer oil and upholding prison's limits on the
number of religious feasts inmates can attend under the RLUIPA).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
290. See 374 U.S. 398, 406-10 (1963) (finding that there must be a compelling state interest
to justify an infringement of the Free Exercise Clause).
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decisions. The Supreme Court, for instance, upheld against free
exercise challenges the uniform application of minimum wage laws, 29 1
social security laws, 292 and sales taxes 293-providing lower courts
ample room to refuse exemptions to other laws under strict scrutiny.
As James Ryan found, under this regime the federal appellate courts
turned away a remarkably high percentage of free exercise challenges
between 1980 and 1990: 87 percent. 294 In these free exercise decisions,
strict scrutiny was, in the memorable words of Christopher Eisgruber
295
and Larry Sager, "strict in theory but feeble in fact."
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith
ruled that strict scrutiny no longer applied to most free exercise
claims. 296 Although the weakness of Sherbert's strict scrutiny led to
the characterization of Smith as a "mercy killing,"297 Congress
responded to Smith by enacting the RFRA, which created a statutory
cause of action for free exercise claimants to seek exemptions from
generally applicable laws. 298 The law provided that courts were to
apply strict scrutiny to laws substantially burdening religious
practices. 299 The Supreme Court did not take well to Congress's
encroachment on its standard-setting turf, and in City of Boerne v.
Flores, the Court invalidated the RFRA to the extent it required strict
300
scrutiny for judicial review of state laws.
Nevertheless, strict scrutiny still applies to a number of
different types of religious liberty claims. First, strict scrutiny still
applies under the RFRA to federal laws substantially burdening the
exercise of religion; City of Boerne only invalidated the RFRA as
applied to state laws. Second, the Smith Court only discarded strict
scrutiny to the extent religious adherents challenged generally
applicable state laws. Where laws intentionally target religions for
discriminatory treatment, the Free Exercise Clause still requires
291. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 299 (1985).
292. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
293. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1990).
294. See Ryan, supra note 98, at 1416-17.
295. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994). For
additional recognition of the survivability of the standard used in free exercise cases, see Gary J.
Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 CAL. L. REV. 441, 459-60 (1996); Joshua R. Geller,
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: An UnconstitutionalExercise
of Congress's Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL-Y, 561, 564 (2003).

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990).
Sullivan, supra note 87, at 300.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
Id.
521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
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strict scrutiny. 3 1 Third, the RLUIPA, passed in 2000, requires strict
scrutiny to be applied to state and federal laws that substantially
burden the religious practices of prisoners and the land use plans of
30 2
religious institutions.
The data set includes religious liberty strict scrutiny
applications from these three remaining sources, in addition to federal
court decisions applying the RFRA to state laws before 1997 (when
City of Boerne was decided). Of the 73 strict scrutiny applications in
final religious liberty rulings, 54 (74%) were statutory in origin and
the remaining 19 (26%) were based on the Free Exercise Clause.
The statutory decisions were far more likely than the
constitutionally-based strict scrutiny decisions to result in the
challenged law being upheld. Under the RFRA and the RLUIPA, the
federal courts upheld 72 percent of the challenged laws, while under
the Constitution-based strict scrutiny the survival rate was 21
percent-the latter in line with most other constitutional doctrines.
Nevertheless, this variation is not a product of statutory strict
scrutiny being different in kind from constitutional strict scrutiny.
Ryan's study of free exercise cases in the 1980s found an 87 percent
survival rate, and all of the cases included there were constitutional
cases. 303 Thus, it is not the statutory origin as such that accounts for
the higher survival rate of some religious liberty cases. Something
else must be at work.
2. Free Exercise Exemptions Versus Discriminatory Treatment
An alternate explanation is that, regardless of whether strict
scrutiny stems from statute or the Constitution, the nature of the
underlying religious liberty claim accounts for the variation in
survival rates. There are two substantive types of religious liberty
strict scrutiny cases: (1) claims for exemptions from generally
applicable laws, and (2) claims that laws intentionally target religious
practices with discriminatory motive. An example of the former is a
religious adherent's lawsuit to permit him to refuse to pay taxes or
participate in the social security program. 30 4 An example of the latter
301. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)
(applying strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause); Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of
Supervisors, 292 F. Supp. 2d 805, 810-11 (E.D. Va. 2003) (applying strict scrutiny under the
Establishment Clause); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1550-51 (D. Neb. 1996) (applying
strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause).
302. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-l(a) (2006).
303. Ryan, supra note 98, at 1416-17.
304. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (refusing to grant a religious
exemption to social security participation).
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is a religious adherent's lawsuit to invalidate a law that bars members
of her religion from practicing a traditional ritual, such as animal
30 5
sacrifice, when other people are allowed to slaughter animals.
This substantive difference closely matches up with the
statutory/constitutional division. Under Smith, constitutional claims
for exemptions from generally applicable laws do not receive strict
scrutiny, thus exemption cases are now brought under the RFRA and
the RLUIPA. 30 6 Religious discrimination claims, by contrast, still
receive strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. The match is
not perfect, however, as the data set includes a small number (4) of
constitutional exemption decisions handed down in the early months
of 1990, before Smith was decided. Most importantly, all four of these
observed applications of strict scrutiny upheld the government's
refusal to grant an exemption. 30 7 Perhaps, then, it is the type of
religious liberty claim rather than the legal source of strict scrutiny
that accounts for the variation.
The data are consistent with this hypothesis. Table 11 reports
the survival rate of strict scrutiny in exemption cases and
discrimination cases.
Table 11. Strict Scrutiny Survival by Type of Religious Liberty Claim
Type of Claim
Survival Rate
Applications (N)
Exemption Claim

74%

58

Discrimination Claim

0%

15

Total

59%

73

F= 41.822, DF= 1, p <.000

Evidently, there is a major difference between strict scrutiny's
deadliness as applied in exemption cases compared to discrimination
cases (p < .000). The survival rate in exemption cases is high, 74
percent of 58 applications-hardly surprising in light of Ryan's earlier
study of exemption decisions. In religious discrimination cases, by

305. Churchof the Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 524-26.
306. 494 U.S. 872, 884-86 (1990).
307. See, e.g., S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1203, 1208-11 (6th Cir.
1990) (refusing free exercise exemption for church from worker's compensation program); United
States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 893 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to exempt school teacher from
dress code requirement).
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contrast, strict scrutiny is truly fatal in fact; there are no survivors in
the 15 applications.
Why is strict scrutiny so easy to overcome in exemption cases?
Perhaps the courts are justifiably worried that they will be
overwhelmed by litigants demanding religious exemptions to every
law that might inadvertently interfere with the great diversity of
Americans' religious practices. 30 8 As Ira Lupu writes: "Behind every
free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice
whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless
chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every
stripe. ' 30 9 My colleague Eugene Volokh argues: "When people are
asking for freedom not just to speak, or to be treated equally without
regard to race, but to act, the law must often intrude on that
freedom." 3 10 Thus, "even when the courts claimed to apply strict
scrutiny, they didn't and couldn't apply strict scrutiny as it has
become familiar in free speech law, race discrimination law, and other
areas." 311 The numbers strongly support these arguments.
In the discrimination cases, however, the courts confront laws
or other government actions that explicitly single out religious
organizations or practices for disadvantageous treatment-for
example, a police department's ban on facial hair that permits medical
but not religious exceptions. 312 That scrutiny in such cases is
particularly deadly ought to be expected. As the Supreme Court wrote
in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, "a law
targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible." 31 3 Yet, to
warrant strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause in the first
place, the law has to subject religions to exactly such discriminatory
treatment. In other words, strict scrutiny only applies to laws that
are by their very nature already unconstitutional.
D. FundamentalRights
Courts also use strict scrutiny to judge the constitutional
validity of legislation infringing on fundamental rights under the
308. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1481 (7th ed. 2004)
(granting exemptions "would make compliance with the law optional for every person").
309. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989).
310. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1465, 1500 (1999).
311. Id. at 1498.
312. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
360 (3d Cir. 1999) (invalidating requirement that police officers shave their beards).
313. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments. 314
Overall, the strict scrutiny survival rate in
fundamental rights cases is 24 percent, with 11 of 46 applications
upholding the challenged laws.
One can break down the fundamental rights cases into several
identifiable groups: (1) substantive due process; (2) right to travel; and
(3) right to vote or to run for office. 315 Each of the three groups
survives strict scrutiny at a different rate, as indicated by Table 12.
Table 12. Strict Scrutiny of Fundamental Rights by Type of Right
Type of Fundamental Right
Survival Rate
Applications (N)
Substantive Due Process

22%

27

Right to Travel

40%

10

Right to Vote/Run for Office

0%

8

Total

23%

45

F= 2.524, DF= 3, p = .071

314. A group of federal court decisions handed down before the time period analyzed in this
Article upheld infringements of bodily integrity of women seeking abortions past the point of
fetal viability. The Supreme Court paved the way for these cases in none other than the
landmark abortion rights decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Roe's trimester
framework, under which the right to choose abortion varied dramatically depending upon where
the woman was in her pregnancy, was built around strict scrutiny. Following this framework,
the lower courts applied strict scrutiny and upheld a variety of late-term abortion restrictions.
See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 289, 299-300 (3d Cir.
1984) (upholding a ban on abortions after viability), affd on other grounds 476 U.S. 747 (1986);
Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 277 S.E.2d 194, 199, 199 n.3 (Va. 1981) (upholding the validity of
a statute proscribing the destruction of a viable fetus), aff'd on other grounds 462 U.S. 506
(1983); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1320-22 (D. Ill. 1978) (upholding a law requiring
persons inducing post-viability abortions to exercise professional skill to preserve the life and
health of the fetus and forbidding experimentation on any viable aborted fetus), appeal
dismissed, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); Doe v.
Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682, 684, 687-88 (D. Mont. 1976) (three-judge panel) (per curium)
(upholding a law making it a crime to "caus[e] the death of a viable fetus delivered during an
abortion" and requiring the concurrence of two additional physicians that the pregnant woman's
life is in danger for any post-viability abortion); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 637 (D.
Ky. 1974) (three-judge panel) (upholding a Kentucky statute that outlawed (1) any abortion on a
fetus which could "reasonably be expected" to be viable, and (2) "any experimentation" on a
viable aborted fetus), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir.
1976); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987) (upholding a ban on abortions after
viability).
315. This excludes one case where the federal court assumed arguendo that the right to bear
arms was a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause. See United States v.
Miles, 238 F. Supp. 2d 297, 301 (D. Me. 2002) (upholding a gun control law under strict scrutiny).
Another group of fundamental rights cases-equal protection challenges to discriminatory
speech restrictions-is treated in this study as free speech cases rather than fundamental rights
cases.
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The variation between these cases is very close to statistical
significance (p = .071). The right-to-vote/run-for-office cases betray a
scrutiny that is fatal in fact; there are no survivors in 8 applications.
These cases involve restrictions on the right to vote or run such as
durational residency requirements, 316 disenfranchisement of people
convicted of misdemeanors, 317 denial of the vote to the mentally ill,318
and mandatory disclosure of one's Social Security number to register
3 19
to vote.
Substantive due process cases, which make up the majority of
strict scrutiny applications in the fundamental rights area, survive at
a rate (22%) consistent with strict scrutiny more generally. Most of
the substantive due process cases involve infringements on the right
to "bodily integrity," which encompasses denials of bail to aliens
detained pending deportation, 320 forced civil commitment of sexual
predators, 32 1 and compulsory medical treatment of criminal
defendants. 322 The most prevalent of these were the alien deportation
cases, where strict scrutiny has proven fatal; no final published
decision of a court upheld the indefinite detention of aliens without
bail under strict scrutiny. 323 The courts also tend to reject another
type of substantive due process infringement: restrictions on parents'
rights to control their children's upbringing (25%).324 By contrast, the
316. See generally Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691 (D. N.J. 2001) (analyzing a
statute that imposed a four-year residency requirement).
317. See generally McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Miss. 1995)
(analyzing statute that prohibited individuals convicted of misdemeanors from voting).
318. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50-51 (D. Me. 2001) (finding a state constitutional
provision unconstitutional because it denied the mentally ill the right to vote).
319. See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1345 (4th Cir. 1993) (analyzing a statute that
required potential voters to supply their social security numbers for police inspection).
320. See, e.g., Bonsol v. Perryman, 240 F. Supp. 2d 823, 826-27 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (invalidating
legislative denial of bail for indefinitely detained aliens); Vang v. Ashcroft, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
1037-38 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same); Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284-85 (D. Colo. 1999)
(same).
321. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1229-30 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding
civil commitment of sexual predator).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Deters, 143 F.3d 577, 582 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding
commitment for psychological evaluation).
323. N = 15.
324. N= 4. In Troxel v.Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000), the Supreme Court invalidated a
Washington state law that allowed any person, at any time, to petition for visitation rights to a
child. A majority of the Court concurred with the plurality opinion's declaration that parents
have a due process right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." Id. at 66 (plurality opinion), 80 (Thomas, J., concurring), 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
Parental rights cases typically arise in state courts and Troxel has led to an avalanche of
state court litigation over the constitutionality of child custody and visitation laws. In scores of
decisions the state courts have upheld laws despite applying strict scrutiny. See, e.g., In re
L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So. 2d 178, 187 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (upholding under strict scrutiny a
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courts generally uphold other types of restrictions on bodily integrity
(75%).325

Laws infringing on the right to travel are relatively more likely
to withstand judicial review (40%). The laws challenged in the rightto-travel cases include juvenile curfew laws,3 27 which are upheld in 66
percent of applications; 328 durational residency requirements for
welfare, 329 which are invalidated in both observed instances; and
restrictions on the ability of certain people to use national lands or
331
other designated areas, 330 which survive 33 percent of the time.
As with all of the other areas of law in which strict scrutiny
applies (except suspect class discrimination), there is no traditional
debate among scholars about the appropriate role of federalism in
judicial review of laws invading fundamental rights. The standard
assumption in constitutional law circles is that courts reviewing
constitutional rights claims treat federal, state, and local laws more or
less uniformly. As revealed by the strict scrutiny data, however,
federalism usually plays a prominent role in accounting for why some
laws survive and others fail review. Federalism may play a role in
fundamental rights cases too. But judicial review here shows signs of
grandparent visitation law); Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (same);
In re C.M., 74 P.3d 342, 345-46 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (same); Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224,
227-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding under strict scrutiny a grandparent visitation law,
although expressing uncertainty about the applicable standard); In re Guardianship of Blair, No.
01-1565, slip op. at 3-4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003) (upholding under strict scrutiny a
grandparent visitation law); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002) (same); Rideout v.
Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 303 (Me. 2000) (same); Fausey v. Hiller, 851 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004) (same); see also In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1242 (Ill. 2001) (upholding statute
providing adoptive parents with the right to seek permanent custody over birth mother's
objection when birth mother is mentally impaired); In re D.W., 799 N.E.2d 410, 425-27 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003) (upholding a statute creating a presumption of parental unfitness when a parent has
been convicted of aggravated or heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child), overruled by
827 N.E.2d 466, 483-85 (Ill. 2005); In re O.R., 767 N.E.2d 872, 876-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(upholding a legal determination of parental unfitness when controlled substances are found in
two of parent's children at birth).
325. N= 4.
327. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492-95 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding juvenile
curfew); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating juvenile
curfew).
328. N = 3.
329. See, e.g., Warrick v. Snider, 2 F. Supp. 2d 720, 729 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (invalidating
durational residency requirement for eligibility for welfare benefits).
330. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Espy, 833 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Idaho 1993)
(upholding travel restriction in national forest); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551,
1553 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (invalidating policy of arresting homeless people for sleeping in public).
331. N = 3.
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turning the federal/state hierarchy upside-down. In contrast with
most of the other rights studied here, federal courts may treat
fundamental rights-infringing federal laws more strictly than state
and, especially, local laws. Between 1990 and 2003, the federal courts
upheld federal laws at a rate of 19 percent, 332 state laws at a rate of 21
percent, 333 and local laws at a rate of 36 percent. 334 Although a
statistical test does not report any significance to this variation (p =
0.551), the findings are nevertheless interesting if only for their
inconsistency with the pattern uncovered in the larger data set. There
is at least some suggestion in the data that fundamental rights strict
scrutiny may actually disfavor federal and state laws as compared to
local laws.
Political ideology may impact fundamental rights strict
scrutiny decisions, although the evidence here, as with federalism, is
weak. If one looks at all judicial votes in these cases broken down by
the proxy of the party of the nominating president, one finds hints of a
potential difference in how Republican-appointed judges approach
fundamental rights cases compared to Democrat-appointed judges.
Democratic appointees invalidate laws invading on fundamental
rights more often than Republican appointees, with Democratic
appointees voting to uphold in 23 percent of observed votes and
Republican appointees voting to uphold in 40 percent. The variation
is close to statistical significance (p = .110), although the total
observations are relatively few and the p-value is sufficiently low to
raise questions about the effect of political ideology in fundamental
rights controversies. If there is a partisan difference here, it would
not be a surprise in light of the relative views of the political parties
on implied, unwritten rights. Republican presidents have argued
strenuously for a philosophy of "strict construction" that is unwilling
to recognize new, unwritten rights in the Constitution. As a result,
Republicans may be more likely to vote to uphold a law alleged to
infringe on such unwritten rights. Again, more study is needed before
knowing if the ideological difference holds in fundamental rights
cases.

332. N=21.
333. N = 14.
334. N = 11.
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E. Freedom of Association
The strict scrutiny survival rate in freedom of association cases
is 33 percent, with 11 of 33 applications resulting in the challenged
law being upheld. The association cases deal primarily with ballot
access restrictions (20 applications), with the remainder comprised of
disputes over laws infringing on other strands of the freedom of
33 5
association right.
Ballot access restrictions, according to the Supreme Court,
implicate "two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights": the
"right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs" and "the right of qualified voters ... to cast their votes
effectively." 336 Whenever ballot access restrictions impose "severe" or
"substantial" burdens on these rights, strict scrutiny is applied. 37
Despite being restricted to severe burdens, strict scrutiny in ballot
access cases was originally portrayed by the Supreme Court as
lenient. In American Party of Texas v. White, 338 the Court wrote that
"any fixed percentage requirement [of support to gain access to the
ballot] is necessarily arbitrary" 339 because any particular percentage
cutoff is going to be over-inclusive and keep parties with slightly less
support off the ballot even with no marginal risk of voter confusion.
In a companion case, Storer v. Brown, 340 the Court noted that "[ilt is
very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws
would fail to pass muster under" the case law.3 4 1 Such sentiments
335. One group of cases that is excluded from this category is campaign finance contribution
limits cases, which Buckley held was protected by the freedom of association. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1976). Contribution limits, like other forms of campaign finance laws,
are usually considered speech limitations despite Buckley and thus have for purposes of this
study been included in the free speech category.
336. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
337. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983) (describing voting rights as
fundamental but stating that not all regulations are "constitutionally-suspect burdens"); Burdick
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
338. 415 U.S. 767 (1974). The Court upheld a ballot access law that required parties polling
less than two percent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial elections to nominate candidates
through conventions and to show support among one percent of voters via petition signatures.
The Court explained that requiring a modicum of voter support was a justifiable means of
advancing the state's interest in electoral integrity and avoiding voter confusion-necessary
components of an effective, meaningful vote. Id. at 783 n.14.
339. Id. at 783.
340. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). The Court upheld a state's denial of a ballot position to any
candidate currently running as an "independent" who had been a registered member of a
political party in the previous year, reasoning that the state's "compelling" interest in avoiding
voter confusion was furthered by limits on the number of candidates on the ballot. Id. at 734-36.
The Court was also clear that strict scrutiny was not necessarily fatal in fact: "The rule is not
self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made." Id. at 730.
341. Id. at 730.

868

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:793

hardly evoke the demanding, skeptical review traditionally associated
with strict scrutiny. Yet the standard has not proven to be unusually
easy to satisfy. Thirty percent of ballot access restrictions survive
strict scrutiny 342-- consistent with strict scrutiny generally.
The Supreme Court has also suggested that laws burdening
other aspects of the freedom of association are capable of overcoming
strict scrutiny. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court upheld
the application of a state antidiscrimination law to the Jaycees, a nonprofit membership organization that traditionally excluded women,
under a strict scrutiny-like analysis. 343 Following the Roberts lead,
the federal courts upheld 5 of 13 (38%) laws burdening the right of
The courts
association outside of the ballot access context. 344
consistently ruled against laws that restricted the associational rights
of political parties (0% survival rate).345 In contrast, they tended to
uphold other types of burdens when the asserted justification for the

laws was public safety or effective law enforcement

(71%).346

The difference in survival rates between ballot access laws and
other types of associational burdens is not significant. 347 Moreover,

342. See, e.g., Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding fusion ban);
Libertarian Party of Kentucky v. Ehrler, 776 F. Supp. 1200, 1211 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (invalidating
nominating petition signature requirement).
343. 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). The Court held that the Jaycees had expressive associational
rights invaded by the antidiscrimination law, which "reflect[ed] the State's strong historical
commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services"-ends the Court deemed to be "compelling state interests of the
highest order." Id. at 622-24. Roberts did not explicitly identify the standard being applied, and
some argue that the Court merely adopted a "balancing-of-interests" test instead of strict
scrutiny. See id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the majority's test as a "balancingof-interests" test). There is language in the opinion supportive of this view, too-a sign of the
opacity of the majority opinion. Id. at 624. But several lower courts have agreed with the Third
Circuit's statement that the "Roberts opinion teaches that strict scrutiny is to be applied to
infringements on the freedom of [expressive] association." Salvation Army v. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs of New Jersey, 919 F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Korenyi v. Dep't of Sanitation,
699 F. Supp. 388, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court "has engaged in strict
scrutiny" of laws restricting association); Bhagwat, supra note 51, at 971 (terming Roberts a
strict scrutiny case).
344. See, e.g., Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483,
1500 (5th Cir. 1995) (invalidating application of anti-discrimination law to private club); McCabe
v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1569-70 (1lth Cir. 1994) (upholding reassignment of police chiefs
secretary after secretary married an officer).
345. N = 4. See, e.g., Arizona Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Bayless, 351 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir.
2003) (invalidating state law imposing semiclosed primary on parties); Cool Moose Party v.
Rhode Island, 6 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121-22 (D. R.I. 1998) (same).
346. N = 7. See, e.g., Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 752-53 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding
city's requirement that participants in a KKK rally at a courthouse pass through metal detectors
on public safety rationale); D~jA vu of Nashville, Inc., v. Metro. Gov't, 274 F.3d 377, 396 (6th Cir.
2001) (upholding nude dancing buffer zone because it deters crime).
347. p = .627.
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variables such as enacting institution, federalism, and political
ideology were not correlated with strict scrutiny survival in either
group of association cases.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Justice Harry Blackmun once wrote that if strict scrutiny is
shorthand for "'incapable of being overcome' upon any balancing
process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable
result, and the test is no test at all."348 This result, however, is
precisely what the oft-repeated formulation of "strict in theory and
fatal in fact" has taught generations of law students. Lawyers often
believe that "the categorization of a law as subject to either strict or
minimal scrutiny is outcome determinative, with the actual
application of those standards a rhetorical and mechanical
afterthought." 349
Kathleen Sullivan captures this widespread
perception:
The key move in litigation under a two-tier system is steering the case onto the
preferred track. The genius of this tracking device is that outcomes can be determined
at the threshold without the need for messy balancing. True, the standard formulations
of these tests require a court to go through the motions of balancing a right against a
legitimate or compelling interest. But this is not real balancing. If the standard is
rationality, the government is supposed to win-and any lawyer who hires expert
witnesses to dispute the empirical basis for legislation under this standard of review is
wasting the client's money. If strict scrutiny is applied the challenged law is never
supposed to survive-well, hardly ever, taking Korematsu into account. Hence Professor
Gerald Gunther's pithy aphorism.. .350

In recent years, Justice O'Connor, among others, has
challenged this traditional view of strict scrutiny. O'Connor has
argued that when courts apply strict scrutiny, "[c]ontext matters. '3 51
Strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact, but rather "is designed to take
relevant differences into account. 3 52

348. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
349. Wells, supra note 80, at 160; see also Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection Under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments: Patterns of Congruence, Divergence and Judicial Deference, 16
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 591, 595 (1989) ("If strict scrutiny virtually insures that a statute will fail
judicial review, and if application of the classic rational basis test yields the opposite result, then
it would seem as if the Court's only real 'decision' is about which standard to apply.").
350. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 296.
351. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
352. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).
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The federal practice strongly confirms Justice O'Connor's view.
Strict scrutiny is not, generally speaking, fatal in fact, and there are
clear patterns in the cases that show how context influences judicial
review. Of the five rights protected by strict scrutiny, courts clearly
apply a much more lenient version of strict scrutiny in religious
liberty cases, in particular those involving claims for exemptions from
generally applicable laws. In addition to doctrinal differences, the
courts are acutely attuned to the identity of the governmental actor
behind a law. Courts are far more likely to uphold federal laws than
state and, especially, local laws. This federalism effect is particularly
profound in suspect class discrimination and free speech cases-the
latter an area of law where the prevailing scholarly literature ignores
federalism as a factor in judicial review. Courts are also more likely to
uphold judicial orders that burden constitutional rights than
legislation or executive action, and tend to uphold prison policies but
not those of educational institutions.
Strict scrutiny review is
institutionally sensitive.
Within discrete areas of law, strict scrutiny varies even more
with the underlying context and courts have identifiable tendencies to
uphold or reject particular types of laws. In suspect classification
cases, courts are relatively likely to uphold law enforcement
affirmative action policies and reject public contracting and
redistricting laws-with Democrats being far more likely than
Republicans to vote to uphold any use of race. In freedom of speech
cases, strict scrutiny is relatively easy to overcome for laws or court
orders limiting access to judicial proceedings or regulating charitable
solicitation.
By contrast, courts systematically invalidate sign
ordinances, viewpoint discriminatory access denials to public forums,
and a range of other speech limitations. Campaign speech restrictions
are capable of surviving, but do not do so at an inordinately high rate
and, surprisingly, strict scrutiny did not prove unusually lenient when
applied to contribution limits. Strict scrutiny is always fatal to laws
intentionally discriminating against religion and to limitations on the
right to vote, but capable of being overcome in substantive due
process, right to travel, and freedom of association cases.
This study only scratches the surface of the strict scrutiny case
law, and many more questions remain to be answered. Which prong
of strict scrutiny is more deadly, the ends analysis or the fit
requirement? Are some ends more likely to be deemed compelling
than others? Is there a functional difference between a fit analysis
that emphasizes over- and under-inclusiveness on the one hand and
less restrictive alternatives on the other? Does strict scrutiny work to
"smoke out" illegitimate motives or is it just a tool to conduct a
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straightforward cost-benefit analysis? What was strict scrutiny like
before 1990, and how much more strict will it be in future years? All
of these questions, however, are only worth asking if strict scrutiny is
capable of being overcome. If nothing else, this study has conclusively
shown that strict scrutiny is survivable in practice and not fatal in
fact.

